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Aliquippa: The Company Town and
Contested Power in the Construction of
Law
KENNETH CASEBEERt
Little Siberia they called it and with good reason. The A.F. of L. or-
ganizers were not even permitted to enter Aliquippa (then called Wood-
lawn) during the great steel strike of 1919. Friends or relatives of its inhabi-
tants were not allowed to stop for an unauthorized visit. Roads were barred
and every stranger alighting from the train was questioned, and if he could
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not render a good account of himself and his business, hustled into jail over-
night and then back to whence he came. When the great steel strike was
called in September 1919 the cordon sanitaire proved its effectiveness; not a
man walked out of the Jones & Laughlin Aliquippa mills.'
Around our Aliquippa Works we have a blank page. We've bought the
land. When the plant is fully built the men who work there will constitute,
with their families, the population of a good sized town. We want it to be
the best steel town in the world. We want to make it the best possible place
for a steelworker to raise a family.
2
We never had labor troubles of any consequence, even though they
were sometimes occurring in the plants of other companies, especially in
1919. I attribute this result to the direct personal contact between our man-
agement and our men.$
The big trouble was, we couldn't call our souls our own. We couldn't
think unionism. All the swimming pools in town and all the athletic fields
and Tom Girdler's man-to-man policy couldn't make up for the fact that we
had no job security. We were treated like pig iron. We were just a
commodity. 4
Aliquippa, Pennsylvania, during the 1930s was the company
town of the Jones & Laughlin Steel Co. The works of Jones &
Laughlin ("J & L" or the "Company") stretch for over three miles
along the Ohio River, twenty five miles north of Pittsburgh. They
are now largely rusted, scavenged hulks of mills that employed
more than 10,000 workers for decades - before the 1980s takeover
by the LTV Corporation in the death pains of the industry.5 Now
they are worked by a few hundred. Then and now, if you did not
float to the company docks, you dropped out of the ridges on the
single road following the bottom of the side valley emptying into
1. National Labor Relations Act and Proposed Amendments: Hearings on S.1000,
S.1264, S.1392, S.1550, S.1580, and S.2123 Before the Senate Comm. on Education and
Labor, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 4657 (1940) [hereinafter NLRA Hearings] (testimony of Philip
Murray, vice president United Mine Workers).
2. ToM M. GIRDLER, BOOTSTRAS 166 (1943) (William Larimer Jones to Tom M. Gir-
dler). Girdler was General Superintendent of the Aliquippa works for J & L from 1920 to
1925, then Vice-President and President to 1930, when he left to become President of Re-
public Steel. There he led Little Steel management in the 1937 strike, during which the
Memorial Day Massacre of union pickets was perpetrated at Republic Steel's Chicago mill.
3. To Create a National Labor Board: Hearings on S.2926 Before the Senate Comm.
on Education and Labor, 73 Cong., 2d Sess. 772, 774 (1934) (testimony of Tom Girdler,
chairman and president, Republic Steel Co.).
4. Spencer R. McCulloch, Career of Tom Girdler, Steel's #1 Strikebreaker, ST. Louis
POST-DiSPATCH, June 29, 1937, at 1C [hereinafter McCulloch] (quoting anonymous
steelworker).
5. Barnaby J. Feder, Survival a Struggle in a Town that Steel Forgot, N.Y. TIMEs,
Apr. 27, 1993, at C1. See generally JOHN P. HOERR, AND THE WOLF FINALLY CAME: THE
DEcLINE OF THE AMERICAN STEEL INDUSTRY (1988) (discussing the decline of the American
steel industry).
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the Ohio. Today, storefronts of old buildings, broken and boarded
up, line the mile or so of the highway through the old town. One in
ten still opens for business, most prominently as liquor stores. The
old hotel, where the union organizers stayed, became a warehouse;
the company store, a subsidized housing center. On either side of
this main street, creeping up the sides of the hills and ridges defin-
ing Aliquippa, the Company built, over time, twelve plans of hous-
ing, one per hill. The hills determined the number of houses. J & L
determined the ethnic groups of workers and townspeople who
would populate each plan. The only way to go between plans was
to drop down into town before starting up a separate hill.
Main street ended at the entrance of J & L, called the Wye
because of the road's abrupt right turn, through a gated tunnel
under the rail road embankment of the Aliquippa and Southern
Railroad, also owned by the Company, which separated the town
from the works. If it was hard to get into Jones and Laughlin with-
out welcome, it was also hard to get out, or to get others in, as the
Company would discover in 1937 during the triumphant organizing
strike of the Steel Workers Organizing Committee ("SWOC"). Ear-
lier, in Aliquippa, life had been just plain hard.
In and after June, 1935, the Company discharged thirteen
men: Domenic Brandy, Angelo Volpe, Harry Phillips, Martin
Dunn, William Collins, George Marroll, Royal Boyer, Gulio
Iacobucci, Martin Gerstner, Angelo Razzano, Ely Bozich, Ronald
* Cox, and.Marco Lukich. The men were discharged for a variety of
alleged causes, including inefficiency and violation of company
rules, such as leaving machine keys unattended, failure to answer a
whistle call, using a head signal rather than a hand signal, failing
to close a door usually left open, and making bad nails."
The men, working with the Amalgamated Association of Iron,
Steel and Tin Workers, AFL ("AA"), brought unfair labor practice
charges of retaliation for union activity to the National Labor Re-
lations Board ("NLRB") under the newly enacted Wagner Act.7
Thus, the Jones & Laughlin case became the test case of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act's ("NLRA") constitutionality. With the
case won in 1937, the Steel Workers Organizing Committee of the
upstart CIO organized the Aliquippa Works following an unexpect-
edly brief forty-eight hour strike. J & L soon signed a less
6. In the Matter of: Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation and Amalgamated Associa-
tion of Iron, Steel & Tin Workers of North America, Beaver Valley Lodge No. 200, No. C-
57, N.L.R.B. Record 33-42 [hereinafter NLRB Record] (incorporated in NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp. 83 F.2d 998 (D.C. Cir. 1936)).
7. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1936) [hereinafter NLRA] (codi-
fied as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1984)). Sect. 8-1 and 8-3 violations were charged.
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favorable version of the industry pattern contract first agreed to by
U.S. Steel earlier that year.
Such describes the case - NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp.' - but not the law. To study any case opinion is to study
only an artifact of a certain point of decision making within a
larger set of institutional actions affecting the parties, with all such
action involving legal intervention, invocation, or reliance. In fact,
the powers affected by legal adjudication are often minor parts of
the contestation of power between the parties, or indeed wider
numbers of people not named. To study the law of the discharged
men is more accurately to study the construction of power exer-
cised in Aliquippa.9 Power is what people actually experience as
their law. Power rarely turns on specific issues, but rather on a
system of social expectations that prevail and define the realm of
the possible. The constellation of power deployed in a community
results from an ongoing historically specific struggle of the people
there over the terms and conditions of social organization.
Ultimately, this article points toward making the study of law,
and the practice of law itself, more explicit as an inevitable part
and arena of struggle over the conditions of social life. Once ex-
plicit in these terms, the legitimacy of legal study and practice will
face stronger pressure to be democratically constituted. Social
democratic visions of the labor process attempt to make labor con-
ditions and production more democratic. Similar visions of law
conventionally attempt to make legal institutions more democratic.
Together they are important strategically within labor and legal
institutions, but are not enough to change barriers to democracy
raised by law itself. At least some of the anti-democratic content of
law depends on the production of legal meaning. To go further
than institutional reform, the democratic project proposed here
uses the social history of labor struggles to breakdown the barrier
confining the understanding of the legal power that lawyers re-
trieve and use to sway judicial opinions, which are in turn limited
to the formal procedures and arguments of justification invoked in
a past case precedent. Thus, while in 1937, organizing J & L and
winning reinstatement of the fired men were transparently sepa-
rate events as NLRB election and Supreme Court decision, as a
8. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
9. This assertion moves a step beyond the familiar insight of the legal realists who in-
sisted law is simply what legal actors, broadly defined, do in fact. What actors do in fact
depends contingently upon historical production of power to make consequences of action
prevail, developed generally in Kenneth Casebeer, Toward a Critical Jurisprudence - A
First Step by Way of the Public Private Distinction in Constitutional Law, 37 U. MIA1t L.
REv. 379 (1983).
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matter of legal power, the men and women of Aliquippa exper-
ienced them together. The social history0 of this company town
during the period of the case is only the topic of this article, but is
not its purpose. This democratic project depends upon recon-
structing the theory of law as an aspect of democratic practice it-
self, and not simply upon reforming legal practices so that democ-
racy is more a part of the operation of legal institutions.
Law functions socially as the legitimation of power exercised
in the production and reproduction of social practices." Those
practices, so often alienating and unfree, are always contested no
matter how natural and uncontroversial legal discourse would have
them appear.' 2 The Wagner Act itself was the product of social
struggle, with both radical and liberal labor relations ideologies
contesting control of the power that is embedded in the statute.
Both visions can be found in its language. The failure to ground
statutory interpretation in the political and economic context of
the passage of the Wagner Act made it easier for federal judges,
hostile to labor, to foreclose the more radical interpretation of
workers' interests in crucial early decisions.' 3
Law is made undemocratic in a step by step process that
reduces each complex struggle to a formal contest over a rule. In
the next episode [case] this rule appears as a settled part of the
natural background that forms the next decision. Turning past me-
diation into present fixed background is an ideological strategy
which unreflectively structures current adjudication practices. It
conservatively overemphasizes the power of past prevailing parties
and their relative power, and excludes the relevance of those whose
voices were disfavored. The task of producing a more democratic
meaning of and for law requires that legal actors explicitly under-
stand and confront their own contemporary social constructions
within the contexts of many voices struggling to be heard and pow-
erful. Training and democratic task collide. In order for law to not
be the mere creature of a part of the citizens, the internal integrity
of legal justice requires the recognition of continuity of present
10. On social history, see ALAN DAWLEY, STRUGGLES FOR JUSTICE: SoCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
AND THE LIBERAL STATE (1991); Alice Kessler-Harris, Social History, in THE NEW AMERICAN
HISTORY 163 (Eric Foner ed., 1990).
11. JURGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1975).
12. Karl E. Klare, The Public-Private Distinction in Labor Law, 130 U. PA. L. REv.
1358, 1358 (1982).
13. Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of
Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978). On the importance of
social conflict to the passage of the Act and its contents, see Michael Goldfield, Worker
Insurgency, Radical Organization, and New Deal Labor Legislation, 83 AM. POL. Sci. REV.
1257 (1989).
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conflict to a contested, not an ahistoric and settled, past. 4
Of course, the production of adjudicated law is simply part of
the experience by which power is exercised in ongoing social life.
Interdependence in the mutual construction of the social identity
of individuals and the meanings available for their lives, further
challenges the adequacy of current legal doctrine. Just as accepted
legal practice does not easily see the ambiguity of past contested
events, so does the complexity of social life yield tangled histories
difficult for legal institutions to assimilate. Law reduces history, as
history is rendered partial for legal consumption. For law to oper-
ate more democratically, the actual people of the dispute must ap-
pear in lived lives, not those artificially distilled and simplified.'
The exercises of power forming the contests related to the
nominal legal dispute and parties must be identified. Often this
requires uncovering the social alienation associated with the use of
that power which has not been justified by democratic participa-
tion in its construction. Often, it is just such power which will be
excluded from scrutiny in the way courts limit the relevant claims
of the nominal parties. Legal cases need to be understood as ongo-
ing mediations of social struggle, rather than as zero-sum conflicts
to be settled. In a democratic form of social organization, legal ac-
tors need to be explicit about the democratic consequences of their
legal intervention. To be democratic in substance, law must incor-
porate the struggle of those who are oppressed in the meaning that
legal actions and decision makers deploy as the artifact of those
who prevail in court.
Power involves what happens to whom. Illustrating the actual
struggle makes clear the degree of authenticity of democratic par-
ticipation in the operation of law as the official account of that
power. What did "discharge for cause" mean-anything the fore-
man could document, or rather that retaliation which would be ex-
perienced in an isolated company town? Even further removed in
abstraction, what are the intellectual limits on terms such as
"wages, hours and conditions of work" as bargainable issues under
the Wagner Act,16 where the line between community and work-
place is experienced so tentatively if at all? Unfair labor practice
14. E. P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HuNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT 258-68
(1975). On the historiography of struggle in the interpretation and genesis of legal develop-
ment, and its opposition to the Progressive Historiography of the early twentieth century,
and also to later Corporate Liberalism, see Klare, supra note 13, at 270-75, 290-91.
15. This requires substantially redefining relevance and causation in order to allow
their experienced meanings, not just their formal participation, to be present. See TERENCE
ANDERSON & WILLIAM TWINING, ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE (1993).
16. NLRA, supra note 7.
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has an entirely different meaning if given legal content, on the one
hand, as an issue of bilateral expectations of formally defined em-
ployees under management direction-labor law of the capital
firm-or if, on the other hand, given content as the distillation of a
web of social power functioning within the mutually constituting
social relations of a particular community. 17 It is not to do social
history, but to do law that I am proposing this project. Linking
social meaning to the contested construction of power is a process
paradoxically foreign to lawyers and their training. As foreign as a
place called Aliquippa to the opinion in Jones & Laughlin.
In the Aliquippa case, actually much of this material is part of
the record because of its origin in the investigations preliminary to
government controlled prosecution, a facet of the case fully in-
tended by the draftsmen of the Wagner Act,"" but invisible in the
final court proceedings. Chief Justice Hughes asks,
When industries organize themselves on a national scale, making their
relation to interstate commerce the dominant factor in their activities, how
can it be maintained that their industrial labor relations constitute a forbid-
den field into which Congress may not enter when it is necessary to protect
interstate commerce from the paralyzing consequences of industrial war?
We have often said that interstate commerce itself is a practical conception.
It is equally true that interferences with that commerce must be appraised
by a judgment that does not ignore actual experience."'
The answer to Hughes' question must surely be: the organiza-
tion of production can not be ignored - because democracy de-
mands a forum representative of all those affected by the system of
regulations reinforcing this particular company organization form
as the economic base of community formation. But this is true in a
way deeper than the judicial upholding of congressional, that is,
national, authority. The same demand of considering all the
sources of contested power shaping actual experience must be
made of judicial characterization of the dispute to be mediated,
before the judge adopts a rule that distributes political control.
Hughes' same conclusion of political theory on the appropriate
constitutional forum could have been reached by focusing on the
availability of labor pools organizable into commuities, attached to
new divisions of labor, and managed by vertical integration. Rather
than the fallout to other firms from strikes, national interest could
have been explained in the fallout to other communities across
17. JAMES ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERIcAN LABOR LAW (1983).
18. Kenneth Casebeer, Holder of the Pen: An Interview with Leon Keyserling on
Drafting the Wagner Act, 42 U. MAmI L. REv. 285, 345 (1987).
19. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 41-42 (1937).
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state lines due to local strikes. The market price system relates
labor and affects community viability exactly as it relates products
and firm viability. But, to double the bind on worker-citizens,
making constitutional power turn on public interests in products
has the additional demerit of articulating labor policy as if the la-
bor time of workers was also a mere commodity, and to further
obscure the necessary connection of government decision and mar-
ket construction.
Labor leaders in this period did articulate the connection be-
tween democracy and corporate power. In defending the Wagner
Act from attempts to weaken it in 1940, SWOC President Philip
Murray spoke of the general experience of the steel worker and the
rising need to interpret Constitutional power to create the condi-
tions of democracy.
[For] 45 years, one single policy governed the relations between steel
workers and their employers. That policy was, as steel employers put it:
"We will deal with our employees as individuals only, and refuse to recog-
nize or deal with them as an organized group or trade-union." That policy
was undemocratic, inhuman, and contravened the fundamental tenets of the
Federal Constitution. It was undemocratic because it denied the steel work-
ers their rights of free association for their mutual protection. It was inhu-
man because it pitted the overpowering corporate wealth of giant industrial-
ists against the puny strength of a single individual workingman. It violated
the Federal Constitution because it forbade the individual worker to join
hands with his fellow workers so that together, as an organized trade union,
their power might begin to equal that of the huge corporation which gave
them employment. That policy was enforced by coal and iron police, labor
spies, tear and sickening gas, and other reprehensible means that mark the
history of the 1901 and 1909 strikes against United States Steel, the 1910
strike against Bethlehem Steel, the 1917 strike against Youngstown Steel,
the 1919 strike against the entire industry, and the 1933 strike against the
Weirton Steel Co.20
Geography and its relation to demographics describes much of
significance for the history of Aliquippa, Pennsylvania. It explains
its site as a company town of a large industrial firm from the early
to the late twentieth century, and thus to the time and circum-
stance appropriate to the labor dispute underlying the test case of
the constitutionality of the Wagner Act. As Peter Irons has docu-
mented, the choice of this case, NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Co., carefully symbolized the need for a federal regulatory scheme
20. NLRA Hearings, supra note 1, at 4636. On the history of the importance of mutual-
ity to labor ideology, see Richard M. Fischl, Self, Others, and Section 7: Mutualism and
Protected Protest Activities under the National Labor Relations Act, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
789 (1989).
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over the internal organization and discipline of the division of la-
bor within enterprise quintessential to advanced capitalist social
organization.21 Importantly, the legal ideology of Congress as the
only forum representing all the stakeholders, in a dispute over the
discharge of a small group of workers in retaliation for union activ-
ities within a vertically integrated basic industry, fit the legitima-
tion of regulatory discipline of this developmental stage of capital-
ist markets. That is what Justice Hughes saw.
It owns or controls mines in Michigan and Minnesota. It operates four
ore steamships on the Great Lakes, used in the transportation of ore to its
factories. It owns coal mines in Pennsylvania. It operates towboats and
steam barges used in carrying coal to its factories. It owns limestone proper-
ties in various places in Pennsylvania and West Virginia. It owns the Mo-
nongahela connecting railroad which connects the plants of the Pittsburgh
works and forms an interconnection with the Pennsylvania, New York Cen-
tral and Baltimore and Ohio Railroad systems. It owns the Aliquippa and
Southern Railroad Company which connects the Aliquippa works with the
Pittsburgh and Lake Erie, part of the New York Central system. Much of
its product is shipped to its warehouses in Chicago, Detroit, Cincinnati and
Memphis,-to the last two places by means of its own barges and transpor-
tation equipment. In Long Island City, New York, and in New Orleans it
operates structural steel fabricating shops in connection with the warehous-
ing of semi-finished materials sent from its works. Through one of its
wholly-owned subsidiaries it owns, leases and operates stores, warehouses
and yards for the distribution of equipment and supplies for drilling and
operating oil and gas wells and for pipe lines, refineries and pumping sta-
tions. It has sales offices in twenty cities in the United States and a wholly-
owned subsidiary which is devoted exclusively to distributing its product in
Canada.2 2
Such a far flung and vast organization of capital depended on
a rational counter-organization of labor to handle disputes over
distribution.
Long ago we stated the reason for labor organizations. We said that
they were organized out of the necessities of the situation; that a single em-
ployee was helpless in dealing with an employer; that he was dependent
21. PETER IRONs, THE NEw DEAL LAWYERS 260 (1982). Irons contributes the most de-
tailed history of the genesis of the Wagner Act and its constitutional defense. On the litiga-
tion and general history of the case the most extensive studies are RICHARD CORTNER, THE
WAGNER AcT CASES (1964) [hereinafter CORTNER, THE WAGNER AcT CASES]; and RICHARD
CORTNER, THE JONES & LAUGHLIN CASE: (1971) [hereinafter CORTER, THE JONES & LAUGH-
LIN CASE]. Cortner describes many of the events surrounding organization as background to
the case only. See CORTNER, THE WAGNER AT CASES, supra, at 114-19; CORTNER, THE JONES
& LAUGHLIN CASE, supra, at 25-28, 32-34, 167-68. He does not attempt to link them to the
substantive law or the litigation directly.
22. 301 U.S. at 26-27.
1995]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
ordinarily on his daily wage for the maintenance of himself and family; that
if the employer refused to pay him the wages that he thought fair, he was
nevertheless unable to leave the employ and resist arbitrary and unfair
treatment; that union was essential to give laborers opportunity to deal on
an equality with their employer.2 3
The organization of networks of capital needed to be balanced
by networks of employees. A balance of forces could leave this type
of dispute behind us, as settled, over, and therefore, unrelated to
the next set of industrial strikes. Justice Hughes did not see what
he did not need to see: the conditions of living in Aliquippa that
would make this labor dispute in fact arise at this time and place.24
And yet, precisely those conditions and social relations would not
have existed but for the particular form of steel production which
made this company town above Pittsburgh a viable economic and
political form of social activity. The relation between the law of
Jones & Laughlin and the political-economy of the company town
in vertically integrated industrial oligopolies makes something dif-
ferent of the constitutional foundation the steel company chal-
lenged in an effort to preserve its local control over production in
the plant and reproduction of the labor supply - however waning
a hope this might prove to be in the pressures of depression. As
Murray saw at the shop floor and in the closed steel communities,
the steel workers' lives are the hidden part of the tonnage that
shifted the constitutional paradigm in Hughes' mind.25 A demo-
cratic interpretation of the distribution of constitutional powers
would take the political effects from the workers' perspective into
account, weaving workers into the fabric of constitutional construc-
tion, just as their mode of production had already demonstrated
the interdependence of their work with the production of others
across the nation. Horace Davis wrote in 1933:
Steel mills require much land, and they are seldom built in the middle
of an existing city. Rather the mill is located outside urban areas, sometimes
far from any important center of population. Steel workers come to live by
the mill; they form a town. In this town the steel company commonly exer-
cises in fact, if not in law, all the functions of government. The company
dominates education and organized religion. It is the state.
The forces that police the steel communities exercise governmental au-
23. Id. at 33.
24. This is not to deny the importance of Hughes realism about federal power as a
sharp break from past judicial practice. For a contemporary lauding of Hughes' political
realism, see Ralph F. Fuchs & Walter Freedman, The Wagner Act Decisions and Factual
Technique in Public Law Cases, 22 WASH. U. L.Q. 510 (1937).
25. On the social history of steel, see generally JOHN BODNAR, WORKERS' WORLD: KIN-
SHIP, CommuNITY, AND PROTEST IN AN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY, 1900-1940 (1982).
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thority but typically are paid by the companies and [are] responsible di-
rectly to them. In time of industrial peace, the mills and company towns are
policed by special deputy sheriffs, usually in uniforms -the retainers of the
feudal lords of steel. In Pennsylvania these guards were formerly members
of the force known as the "coal and iron police." . . All commissions were
revoked in 1931, but the legal basis of the system remains unchanged. The
United States is the only important industrial country which permits pri-
vate payment of officers of the law.28
Who then are these men - Brandy, Iacobucci, Boyer and
Bozich, and the others? Where are they from? What did they do
and how did they keep it from the J & L police? Why did they win
at the tunnel gates? Start with the overwhelming reality of the
workers of Aliquippa - Jones & Laughlin. The Company built the
town, the Company owned the town.
MAKING ALIQUIPPA
The town gained its name from Queen Aliquippa, the Seneca
leader of the local Delaware tribe of the Iroquois, who resided in
the area which became West Aliquippa. She was friendly toward
the British. A young George Washington wrote in his 1753 journal:
I went up about three miles to the mouth of the Youghiogany, to visit
Queen Aliquippa, who had expressed great concern that we passed her in
going to the fort. I made her a present of a watch-coat and a bottle of rum,
which latter was thought much the better present of the two.
27
At this time, the location was neutral territory for Native Ameri-
can tribes meeting in counsel or trade. At the point of the river
which was to become first Woodlawn and then Aliquippa, a trading
post known as Logstown was established, followed by a station on
the Pittsburgh and Lake Erie Railroad much later in 1878.28 Dur-
ing the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the railroad ran
daily excursions here to Jones Woods along the river, which it
leased as an amusement park. Aliquippa Park boasted picnic
grounds, a dance hall, amusements, a roller coaster, a trotting
track, and beautiful scenery.29
Meanwhile, in 1851, Benjamin Franklin Jones bought a small
iron works in Pittsburgh, merging in 1857 with James Laughlin to
26. HORACE B. DAvis, LABOR AND STEEL 140 (1933).
27. JOSEPH BAUSMAN, HISTORY OF BEAVER COUNTY 850 (1904).
28. History of Aliquippa Area Can be Traced to 1669, BEAVER VALLEY TImEs, Sept. 12,
1953, § 2, at 11; supra note 27.
29. THE TWENTIETH CENTURY HISTORY OF BEAVER COUNTY 41 (Cheryl W. Beck ed.,
1989).
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form the Jones & Laughlin Steel Company.30 In 1898, when it be-
came evident that the company needed to expand beyond the lim-
its of its Pittsburgh holdings, agents for the company began buying
up undeveloped farm land and swamps in and around Woodlawn
and West Aliquippa, including the amusement park along the
river. 1 In 1905, plans for a fully integrated steel manufacturing
mill in the center of seven and a half miles of Company owned
riverbank were completed, and in November of 1906, Paul Moore,
head of the Company's Woodlawn Land Co.mpany subsidiary, be-
gan groundbreaking for the first blast furnace. Building the entire
plant would last into the twenties. By then, the mills were fully
integrated, with open hearth furnaces, Bessemer converters, coking
ovens, and tinplate, tubing and wire metal work sub-divisions. 2 In
the early 1930s, Jones & Laughlin ranked as the fourth largest
steel company in the United States, with gross assets of 181 million
dollars and 4.9% of the gross tonnage in the national market. The
Aliquippa Works alone would have constituted the nations sixth
largest producer by both employment and gross tonnage.3 3
At first the work force consisted of mostly the local population
of British and German stock. But as with other Pennsylvania mill
towns, substantial immigration transformed the population before
1920.34 During this time the population increased nearly five fold,
from 3140 to 15,426, with 40% of the total being foreign-born.3 5 As
the industry and J & L grew, the company recruited workers in
waves of Italian immigrants, and by the early 1930s, primarily
Eastern Europeans, including Poles, Slavs and Ukrainians. When
union organizing began in the thirties, larger portions of the work
force were at least first generation natives. The total population
stayed virtually the same, 27,116 in 1930 to 27,023 in 1940. How-
30. Family's Fourth, TIME, Apr. 13, 1936, at 72.
31. Gertrude Hightower, History of Aliquippa, Logstown and Woodlavw 7 (1941) (un-
published manuscript, on file at the B.F. Jones Memorial Library, Aliquippa, Pa.).
32. For the definitive study of the economic and structural development of the steel
industry generally, see volumes I and II of CARROLL R. DAUGHERTY ET AL., THE ECONOMICS
OF THE IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY (1937). For a discussion of the development of the Jones &
Laughlin Steel Co., see 1 DAUGHERTY, supra, at 22, 339 n.3, 488; 2 DAUGHERTY, supra, at
666-67, 712, 715.
33. 1 DAUGHERTY, supra note 32, at 22-24.
34. On immigration and steel generally, see JOHN BODNAR, STEELTON: IMMIGRATION AND
INDUSTRIALIZATION, 1870-1940 (1977) [hereinafter BODNAR, STEELTON]. On the conditions of
steel workers in Pittsburgh early in the century, see JOHN A. FITCH, THE STEEL WORKERS
(1911).
35. Dept. of Engineering and Public Policy, School of Urban Affairs, Carnegie-Mellon
University, Milltowns in the Pittsburgh Region: Conditions and Prospects 70 (May 1983)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with Labor Archives, Hillman Library, University of
Pittsburgh).
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ever, for men 21 years and older in 1930, native-whites totalled
3239; foreign born whites 4713; and African-Americans 906; shift-
ing by 1940 to 4333; 3654; and 1031 respectively. 6 Of the 4708 for-
eign born men over 21 listed in Aliquippa in 1930, 337 were from
Poland, 451 from Czechoslovakia, 241 from Austria, 1218 from Yu-
goslavia, 217 from Greece, 1276 from Italy and 968 from other
countries.3 7
In the 1930s, Jones and Laughlin still controlled the town eco-
nomically.38 It employed 10,000 of the town's population of 30,000.
7918 men and 1224 women were classed as workers in 1940, of
which 6125 men and 169 women worked in Iron and Steel."' J & L
owned 700 houses occupied entirely by employees, and it built
many of the rest within twelve "plans" on land owned by its sub-
sidiary, the Woodlawn Land Co. (the "Land Company"). Log-
stown, site of the original settlement, became Plan #2. This area,
known as the Borough of Woodlawn, included 767.5 acres, of which
623.5 were owned by J & L. The Land Company's brochure de-
scribed the future of "Woodlawn on the Ohio."
Woodlawn nestles in a beautiful valley 19 miles down the Ohio from
Pittsburgh, in Beaver County, and spreads out its cozy homes upon the sur-
rounding hills. Its streets are paved with brick in the business section and
macadam in the residence section, concrete sidewalks, shade trees, sewere
[sic] and electric lighted. It has every modern utility, such as natural gas,
electric light, a pure potable water supply, and ample police and fire protec-
tion. Its school system is splendidly organized and its opportunities for de-
lightful home and neighborhood life are not equaled in this end of the state.
The new works are attracting iron and steel workers of the better class and
the new town is designed to give them the very best homes amidst the most
beautiful surroundings. The houses put up by the Woodlawn Land Com-
pany contain from six to ten rooms and bath, are constructed of brick, ce-
ment or frame or combinations of these materials, and are in every respect
as attractive and convenient as any suburban town in the district can show,
and are above the average city home in point of comfort and convenience. 40
In 1917, these houses cost between $2200 and $2400, and con-
sisted of a downstairs with a living room, dining room and kitchen,
36. 2 BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, SIXTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED
STATES: 1930: POPULATIONS, pt. 6, at 163 (1940) [hereinafter CENSUS].
37. Id. at 489.
38. For a study of life in a typical steel company town, see CHARLES WALKER, STEEL-
TOWN: AN INDUSTRIAL CASE HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN PROGRESS AND SECURITY
(1950).
39. CENSUS, supra note 36, at 183.
40. Mill Creek Valley Historical Association, Story of the Woodlawn Land Company 4
(n.d.) [hereinafter Woodlawn] (unpublished manuscript, on file at the B.F. Jones Memorial
Library, Aliquippa, Pa.).
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and an upstairs, with three large bedrooms and a bathroom with
running water. The houses were being completed at the rate of one
per day.41 Early immigrants with houses rented to boarders to ac-
commodate the overwhelming demand. The three large bedrooms
would house up to 25 men, each of whom would have the use of the
bathroom and a bed for the duration of one shift. Families could
rent a two room makeshift apartment upstairs, which consisted of
a one room living room/kitchen, a bedroom, and the use of a
shared bath.42 Women made and sold lunches to the single men on
each shift. According to a June 1930 survey, "American employees
preferred six room dwellings for their families. Many foreign, and
nearly all Negro families found no constraint in houses of four
rooms and bath, considering primarily the cheapness of the house,
whether for purchase or for rent.
43
A worker-occupant could buy a home on time, the title re-
maining with the company. A deed and mortgage would be deliv-
ered to the purchaser upon payment of 50% of the purchase price.
If the worker voluntarily left J & L employ, the Land Company
would refund the payments less three percent. Whether one left
voluntarily depended, in part, on what hours were worked, and
therefore whether the house payments could be made. One of the
plaintiffs, Ronald Cox, was called into the office of the general
manager and told "that if he persisted in affiliating with the union,
the company would not tolerate his back rents, and would have to
put him out of the house; that the local merchants would not ex-
tend any credit. '44 In the early 1930s, 40% of Aliquippa families
had mortgages controlled by J & L.
Only the Woodlawn Land Co. sold lots to merchants along
Franklin Avenue, Aliquippa's mainstreet. The Pittsburgh Mercan-
tile Co., the company store, was the only outlet for clothing and
sundries which it would sell on credit, with payments to be de-
ducted from paychecks.
This benevolent system of credit has the effect of keeping men within
the company town, within control of the mill officials. And it assures always
a surplus of labor which can be drawn upon whenever needed.. . . In Ali-
quippa, as pay envelope deductions, the workers are allowed only enough
cash to buy food and meet such bills as can be taken care of in no other
way. The average workman with a family to support and a normal debt
owed the company, is allowed not more than $10 a week in cash. All of his
earnings above that sum, [Plant Superintendent] Saxer said, are credited
41. THE TWENTIETH CENTURY HISTORY OF BEAVER COUNTY, supra note 29, at 41.
42. Id. at 42.
43. Woodlawn, supra note 40, at 8.
44. NLRB Record, supra note 6, at 208 (testimony of Ronald Cox, March 2, 1936).
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against his obligations to the company.4
The company owned the railroad, the water company, the bus
company, and the trolleys. The town newspaper, the Aliquippa
Gazette, while nominally independent, was tied to its revenue
sources, and therefore maintained an extremely pro-company and
anti-union editorial policy, frequently warning residents in front
page, boxed stories about specific outside agitators sighted in the
area.
By 1934, some observers were not reading the brochures.
An ugly main street of squatty,.dingy business buildings sprawled over
the ravine between hills, leading to the fortress like entrance to the steel
mill. On the steps of the hills rising from either side of the main street are
the homes of the mill hands - dingy, dirty -looking frame shacks built by
the company. The typical house has five small rooms crowded into two
floors, the dwellings built close together. So steep are the hills sloping down
to the main street that in heavy rains, tin cans, and the litter from the
slopes gush into the main street of the borough. Beyond the area of the
-main thoroughfare the streets are unpaved cinder paths. Fumes from the
mills and the coke plant have had their effect on vegetation. The original
verdure of the hills is gone.
46
Land ownership also allowed the company to control commu-
nity development. As former Aliquippa resident, Donald Thomp-
son, put it, "You can call it ruthless segregation or common sense,
but the company carved up its community into plans and assigned
each incoming nationality to its own - Italians to Plan 11, Anglo-
Saxons to Plan 12 across the valley, Serbians to Plan 7, and Plan 6,
the highest hill, reserved for management. ' '47 The planned geo-
graphical barriers became, in a sense, law. Many of the steel
workers,
when asked, will tell the story of a Negro who was killed by a Jones &
45. Mac Parker, Steel and its Men - Battle of Giants, PHmADELPHIA REc., June 27,
1934, § 2, at 1. Consider the experience of workers in the more open Pittsburgh Works.
As early as 1929, nearly half of the workers in the Pittsburgh plants of the J. & L.
had accounts at the company store, and their debts to the store were regularly
checked off their wages. Since the depression, the proportion has vastly increased,
so that nearly all the workers are being "carried" to a greater or less extent at the
store, until they are laid off entirely. This "carrying" puts the workers more than
ever in the company's power.
DAvis, supra note 26, at 144.
46. Parker, supra note 45, at 1, 2.
47. Interview with Donald Thompson, quoted in Eric Leif Davin, The Littlest New
Deal: SWOC Takes Power in Steeltown, a Possibility of Radicalism in the Late 1930s (n.d)
(unpublished student paper, on file with the University of Pittsburgh Labor Archives). See
also Harold Ruttenberg, Steel Town, NATION, Nov. 28, 1934, at 623, 624.
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Laughlin policeman about a year and a half ago for breaking into a house in
the "white plan," the section where only bosses and officials live and where
by an unwritten law no Negro, Italian, or Slovene is allowed. Many doubt
whether the Negro was really breaking into a house, but the incident served
to intimidate the workers.48
By 1916, when Bert Iacobucci arrived from Italy, Plan 11 was
virtually entirely occupied by Italians from the Southern Province
of Patrica. Ninety percent of Plan 11 were Patricans. Bruzzes'
moved to West Aliquippa. The Music and Politics of Italy Club
was split almost equally between the provinces. This high concen-
tration of immigrants from two small areas in Italy resulted from a
pattern of immigration. Immigrants would pretend to already have
a job lined up in America when they were simply following familial
word of earlier settlement. 49 This tended to replicate the tight geo-
graphic concentration preferred by the company and encouraged
by the terrain. This isolation by plans perched on steep hills was
compounded by economic circumstances. There were one or two
households with a telephone on all of Plan 11.
Ethnic customs also allowed for greater police control. Italian
families made wine. Who made wine was easily known by observ-
ing who bought crates of grapes at the freight station. As long as
wine was not sold during prohibition, home consumption was left
alone. However, it served as a convenient excuse to harass those
who found themselves on the bad side of the police. Police would
break into houses to search ostensibly for liquor and take union
papers while smashing the wine barrels. The automatic fine for
possession was $11.45. Some activists paid this fine on a weekly
basis. 10
Geographic immobility matched social immobility. During the
1920s, Aliquippa's population approximated 25,000, but only 50 to
75 students graduated from high school. To get jobs at J & L, boys
who were under the minimum age of sixteen obtained false age cer-
tificates from certain local officials for a small fee. Many immigrant
and black children were assigned to work for the summer quarter
and given the winter quarter off. In the three out of four quarters
attendance-system, students often dropped out of school to help
their families work the garden plots which provided their margin
against hunger. Almost all of the J & L jobs went to men. The only
viable opportunity for young women seemed to be marriage to a
48. Ruttenberg, supra note 47, at 624.
49. Interview with Bert Iacobucci 3-4 (Dec. 5, 1979), in Beaver Valley Labor History
Society Papers [hereinafter lacobucci Interview] (on file in Labor Archives, Univ. of Pitt.).
50. Id. at 18-19.
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millworker, a depressing prospect given the much smaller number
of eligible males within the tightly knit and segregated ethnic
communities.
Of course, the police exerted the most direct form of social
control. The borough police were in reality an arm of the Jones &
Laughlin company police, and their police chief had been em-
ployed by J & L. The company supplied men to become policemen,
and anti-union operations were run out of the office of the J & L
police chief, William Mauck. Prior to 1935, no public hall would
issue a license to hold any open union meeting in Aliquippa. Work-
ers soliciting authorization cards were followed, arrested on suspi-
cious person charges, taken to the city jail, searched and, if union
cards were found, fined or beaten. When people were taken into
police custody, "they third degreed everyone who came down
there." 51 Fines were simply deducted from the monthly pay check
along with rent and debts owed to the company store.52 Records
were kept of all persons entering and leaving any hotel where
union organizers stayed.
What happened in the streets, served as object lessons against
protest in the plant. New men recruited from other regions were
publicly fired and evicted in front of other workers for gathering
socially in each others' houses. A young electrical worker protested
his treatment to his foreman, who called the mill police. Four po-
licemen began pushing the electrician around. He tried to escape
the property by climbing over a coal pile. The police dragged him
back to the mill, severely beat him in front of the workers, a gen-
eral foreman bound him with hay wire around the hands and feet,
and they threw him into a police car.53
Political organization and social control became a seamless
web. "In T.M.'s [Girdler] day you would report for work in the
morning. The foreman would say: 'Up kind of late last night
weren't you?' When you asked why you would be told: 'The light
was burning in your room at 2 a.m.' "51 Similar control extended to
electoral politics.
On one occasion a small shopkeeper pointed to the fact that members
of the governing council of Aliquippa were at the same time continuing to
receive salaries as J. & L. officials, in violation of Pennsylvania state law. At
the next election these men were replaced with others not openly in the
company's pay but equally satisfactory to it. "The company ought to have
something to say about the way the town is run," said an official of the J. &
51. Id. at 20.
52. NLRA Hearings, supra note 1, at 4179 (testimony of Clifford Shorts).
53. Id. at 4178.
54. McCulloch, supra note 4, at 1C (quoting anonymous steelworker).
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L. housing subsidiary, describing the incident. "The company owns pretty
near everything in sight."5
During elections in the 1920s, Jones & Laughlin trucked people
from the mills to voting places, whether they were naturalized citi-
zens or not. Nino Colonna was taken to vote before he was fifteen
and every year thereafter. He voted four letter words on the bal-
lot."' Workers were fired for reading anarchist literature, and for
belonging to the Democratic Party. Republican Party Chairman, J.
A. Ruffner wrote an undated form letter, probably for the 1936
elections.
Dear Sir: In the opinion of the Central Republican Committee the elec-
tion to be held next November 6th is of the highest importance to the peo-
ple of Pennsylvania. Every citizen should exercise his or her right of
franchise on that day.
THE RECORDS SHOW THAT YOU FAILED TO VOTE AT THE
PRIMARY HELD LAST MAY.
You are strongly urged to vote on November 6th, and the Committee
requests that you vote the straight Republican ticket. '57
Workers were fired especially for attempts at economic self-
organization. If there was perceived to be a difference in these
posed threats, unionism was the highest sin. Pete Muselin, born in
Croatia, arrived in America in 1912, and reported being threatened
and arrested numerous times for attempting to hold an organizing
meeting. He was told that,
[w]e make the rules. This is not the United States. This is Woodlawn,
and we're going to do what we please because J & L gives bread and butter
to all these people. . . . Every once in a while the cops came to my home
and just raided the place - no warrant, no nothing. They would take every
book, every periodical, every bulletin; they'd just dump them in a pile and
throw them in the police cruiser and they would never return them. They
were looking for books on Marxism, but they could not distinguish one book
from another, in order to make sure they cleaned out the house."8
While he was chief of police, Mike Kane would run his motorcycle
right into a boarding house kitchen to break up the "Hunkies."
In Aliquippa, attempting to organize a union was punishable
55. DAvis, supra note 26, at 141.
56. Interview with Nino Colonna 6-7 (Sept. 9, 1979), in Beaver Valley Labor History
Society Papers [hereinafter Colonna Interview] (on file in Labor Archives, Univ. of Pitt.).
57. Letter from J. A. Ruffner (on fie in Steel Workers Union file, Historical Collections
and Labor Archives, Pattee Library, Penn State Univ.).
58. Pete Muselin, The Steel Fist in a Pennsylvania Company Town, in BUD SCHULTZ
& RUTH SCHULTZ, IT DID HAPPEN HERE 70 (1989) [hereinafter Muselin, Steel Fist].
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by five years in prison. At a fraternal lodge meeting in 1926, Muse-
lin and four other Croats were arrested and indicted on a charge of
sedition.5 The district attorney would not touch the case. The so-
licitor for Jones & Laughlin, Dave W. Craig, was appointed special
prosecutor. The Croats were convicted in 1927 and sentenced to
five years in the county work house. For any infractions, prisoners
were sent to the hole, and given two slices of bread and a cup of
water per day. Miles Reseter died in the prison hospital two or
three months before the others were released in 1932.60 Later, for-
mer J & L President Tom Girdler denied any coercion against
unionists.
I don't recall any steps taken to discourage their activities, except the civil
liberties and the freedom of speech that we had at that time, sometimes
advising a man that he was better off in attending to his own business and
handling his own affairs instead of having someone else handle them for
him.6 1
Harry Phillips, the first president of Beaver Valley Lodge 200,
Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers was fol-
lowed by J & L police, then beaten by unknown assailants in a
dark alley. Phillips told his story to the National Steel Labor
Board.
[O]n August 30th I was delivering journals to different men to sign up on
Davison Street and the Jones & Laughlin police - Donnelly and Slater and
Chief Ambrose of the Aliquippa police - drove up to me and said, "What are
you doing?" I said, "Delivering these papers." I give them one and it tells
about the big meeting in Ambridge. They started to ask me some questions
59. Sedition Act of 1919, 1919 Pa. LAws 275. The act reads in pertinent part:
Section 1. Be it enacted,&c., That the word "sedition," as used in this act,
shall mean: Any writingpublication, printing,cut, cartoon, utterance, or conduct,
either individually or in connection or combination with any other person or per-
sons, which tends:
(c) To incite or encourage any person or persons to commit any overt act with
a view to bringing the government of this state or of the United States into hatred
or contempt.
It shall also include:
(h) Organizing or helping to organize or becoming a member of an assembly,
society, or group, where any of the policies or purposes thereof are seditious as
hereintofore defined.
60. Muselin, Steel Fist, supra note 58, at 72-73.
61. Violations of Free Speech and Rights of Labor: Hearings before a Subcommittee of
the Senate Committee on Education and Labor, 74th Cong., 3d Sess. 13787 (1938) (testi-
mony of Tom Girdler to "LaFollette Committee").
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and I said, "I ain't going to answer questions. I got to be at work at nine
o'clock." So I went home and changed my clothes and started down the
street, and when I got to the bottom of the hill around the Catholic Church
- that is on Main Street beyond Franklin Avenue - they passed me there,
and they passed me a little further down the street. I didn't see the Chief in
the car the next time they passed me, and the last time they passed me just
as I got near the old Rialto Theater. I went to the "Y" and happened to
meet a fellow by the name of Robinson at the corner. I talked to him a few
minutes, and he said, "I see the Jones & Laughlin police driving around
backward and forward." I went to catch up to a man in front of me going to
work. He wasn't more than twenty feet in front of me. I was going in the
tunnel. There was a man there [who] said, "Harry." I turned around. I said,
"Just a minute." I didn't get a chance to say that before I got planted in the
mouth and struck over the head with a black-jack. I was pulled in between
two automobiles, and the next blow I got must have hit me on the shoulder
because I don't remember going in there. I knew I had to grab so I got hold
of them. I had one man down and the other man half way down. I held
them there until some help came. I made a lot of noise - I tried to anyhow.
They pulled one man off, and the man they pulled off said, "Let them two
fight", so they figured he was going to stand by and let them two fight.
Before we could get up this man started after me with a black-jack again.
When he started in after me he had a black-jack in one hand and screw
driver in the other, and when I started to come up he hooked me on the side
of the eye btit didn't break the flesh - just scratched me. When I got up he
made a swing with the black-jack at me and I ducked out in the open. I was
going to run in and kick at the man but when I looked at the man again my
head wasn't clear and instead of seeing one I saw four, so I thought the best
thing for me to do was get out of the way. They started to run. I couldn't
find anything to grab hold of but a piece of slag. I could just barely lift it
and I couldn't throw it very far, and he started up the steps. He made a
motion to throw the screw driver back at me and I went to look for a Bor-
ough cop. In that location there is generally one or two at all times. We have
traffic lights there. It is a pretty bad intersection at that point, and they
always need an officer there to watch traffic most of the time. I went all the
way from there to the police station.62
When requesting police protection from town police he was told,
"Get the hell out of here. You don't deserve protection." Later, at
the Steel Labor Board proceedings, Phillips recognized one of the
attackers at a hearing on Huntington, West Virginia's organizing
drive.
Company police broke into Financial Secretary Martin
Gerstner's house while he was at work. The police threatened his
wife and suggested that he should stop union agitating. Martin
62. In the Matter of Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers of North
America, Beaver Valley Lodge v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp: Hearing before the National
Steel Labor Relations Board 85-86 (Nov. 16, 1934) (on file in Labor Archives, Univ. of Pitt.).
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Gerstner moved to Ambridge. Royal Boyer, a leader of African-
Americans in the plant, also had his wife warned of his activities.
And then there was George Isoski. Isoski worked for J & L
until he fell from a scaffold and spent 22 months in the hospital
with a broken back. In exchange for waiving any corporate liabil-
ity, he was promised a job for the rest of his life. Less than a week
after his return from recuperation, he was discharged.63 Isoski was
not a union leader, but was active in collecting union cards among
fellow workers. One evening in 1933, he was stopped by town po-
lice on a public street.
I went up to see Mr. [Martin] Gerstner, 213 Franklin Avenue, Financial
Secretary. While going up, I seen two Jones & Laughlin Company police-
men standing in front of this building and when I came back down from his
house, they still were standing there. So I started for home when a friend of
mine came to me and told me to watch myself because there is some cops
following me. So I started for home and I got as far as the Laughlin School,
and a machine came up and three company police came to me and one of
them said, first he pointed his finger at me, and asked me how many cards I
signed up and I said, "Its none of your business", and then he said again,
"You bastard, how many cards have you", and I said none, when all at once
he reached over and started searching me while the other cops watched and
he took from the inside of my shirt, about fifty cards.
6 4
Police first arrested him for his own protection, claiming that
he was drunk. He was taken to the station, held without contact,
questioned and then, by the suggestion of the police chief, the next
morning, a Sunday, was committed to the State Hospital for the
Insane in Torrence, Pennsylvania. The commitment itself was not
preceded by the hearings required by state law or medical proce-
dure. Instead, he was examined by a panel which consisted of the
company doctor, the company nurse, and the company real estate
agent. His family was not informed of his whereabouts. Isoski
spent two months in Torrence before intercession by Governor
Pinchot forced his release.
In 1933, workers struck the Spang-Chalfant specialty steel
plant across the river in Ambridge. Workers at various factories in
Ambridge had voted to join the Steel and Metal Workers Indus-
trial Union. Before joining the union, organizing in Ambridge
started over the depression. The seven steel fabricating plants
there adopted a share the work policy. No one was fired, but wages
63. Bruce Minton, Steel Towns that Labor Runs, NEW MASSEs, Feb. 8, 1936, at 7.
64. Statement of George Issosky, Exhibit 5, Steel Labor Board Investigation, in Clinton
Golden Papers (on file in Historical Collections and Labor Archives, Pattee Library, Penn.
State Univ., University Park, Pa.).
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were slashed in 1930 and 1931, and workers worked intermittently
during each pay period. Many were without enough money for
food. An Unemployed Council 5 grew rapidly to fight evictions and
water and gas cutoffs.
The Council would assemble a large group of people in front of the
house or apartment from which a family had been evicted. The members of
the group carried the family's furniture back inside the dwelling ...
Some landlords tried to force tenants out of the apartments by turning
off the heat and taking glass out of the windows. The Council fought this
tactic by collecting cardboard and placing it over the empty window frames.
Council activists fought gas and water main shutoffs by using a special
rod made by a blacksmith to reopen closed valves. They poured concrete
over the reopened valves so that the gas or water company would have a
hard time shutting them again.6
Experience networking and organizing for the Unemployment
Council became a direct basis for union organization.
On October 2, 1933, workers at the National Metal Moulding
Works voted a strike. The next morning, the men marched to the
mill demanding full recognition of the union. The company asked
for a few days to think about it, and a union committee asked the
workers whether they wanted to come in or stay out. They decided
to stay out. The mill closed and nothing happened. The same
events occurred at H.H. Robertson, Central, Wykoff, and Byers
Mills. At 3:00 p.m. the same day, a delegation, composed first of
Spang-Chalfant workers and followed by other union members,
went to the Spang mill. They were met there by company deputies
armed with rifles, tear gas guns, and machine guns. On October 4,
fifteen men tried to go to work and were forcibly stopped by the
pickets. Immediately, tear gas and gun shots came from within the
mill, wounding one of the pickets.6 7 The following day's events
were documented in hearings ordered by Governor Pinchot on
"Special Policing in Industry" in Ambridge, March 10, 1934. Sher-
iff O'Laughlin, chief law enforcement official in Beaver County and
formerly head of the Jones & Laughlin Coal and Iron Police, was,
in his words, contacted by all the industrial plants demanding pro-
tection and offering to pay all expenses of special deputies. Where-
65. On the Unemployment Councils and their relation to the CIO, see Roy Rozenzweig,
Organizing the Unemployed: The Early Years of the Great Depression, in WORKERS'
STRUGGLES, PAST AM' PRESENT: A RADIcAL AmRmCA READER 168 (James Green ed., 1983).
66. The Great Ambridge Strike of 1933, BEAVER VALLEY LAB. HIST. J., Jan., 1980, at 1.
67. League for Social Justice, Report on Ambridge Riot 1-2 (1933) [hereinafter Social
Justice Report], in Beaver Valley Labor History Society Papers (on file in Labor Archives,
Univ. of Pitt.).
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upon, he got William Shaffer, commander of the American Legion
Post in Aliquippa, to provide seventy-five boys with military expe-
rience, and added another seventy-five by his own efforts. In all
248 special deputies were sworn in, of which about fifty were J & L
employees. The steel companies eventually paid $24,811.40. The
men were transported to Ambridge, organized into squads of four
with at least one ex-serviceman, given weapons, and placed under
the command of four lieutenants. One of these was Mike Kane,
who was at that time justice of the peace in Aliquippa and an em-
ployee of J & L. The force was accompanied by Burgess (mayor)
Caul of Ambridge and the county's prosecuting attorney. They
marched military style to the Spang-Chalfant plant on Twenty-
third Street, carrying tear gas, shotguns, clubs, revolvers and ma-
chine guns, marked with white handkerchief arm bands and some
wearing overseas helmets.""
The line halted in front of the Wycoff office. Pickets in the front line
there stood silent, grimly clutching clubs. Women's voices behind these men
sent vile insults at the long line. From the head of the column came: "Break
'em up."
Deputies stepped out of rank. One used his club on a striker, hitting
the man across the knuckles to force him to drop a stick.
The hundreds of spectators who had crowded the sidestreets, sensing
the danger for the first time, started to run up alleys and between houses.
Many strikers joined them. But many stayed and defiantly jeered.
Suddenly I heard an explosion and saw a tuft of white smoke seemingly
"bouncing" off the side of a brick house across from the Wycoff office. The
tuft spread into a cloud and sent people scurrying down Duss Avenue to-
ward Ambridge. It was tear gas.
Two other bombs were shot from deputies['] guns in the same manner
and that part of the avenue was effectively cleared.
The marchers then resumed toward the main body of strikers at the
Spang works.
The crowd of pickets, spectators and newspapermen knotted at the
plant entrance all realized that identity meant nothing to the deputies, who
meant to clear the sector at any cost.
A sedan leading the marchers reached the entrance unmolested, as did
the head of the column, which halted.
Out of the car stepped a well-built neatly-dressed man - Sheriff Charles
O'Laughlin of Beaver County.
Mounting the car's running board, he raised his two hands and asked
for silence. The crowd quieted down.
"We're here" he said slowly, "to clear open up this entrance and clear
68. Commission on Special Policing in Industry Report to Governor Pinchot (1934)
[hereinafter Governor's Report], in Beaver Valley Labor History Society Papers (on file in
Labor Archives, Univ. of Pitt.).
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these streets and we can do it. I hope you'll go peacefully,"
He stepped to the ground. Before the crowd had time to take up its
wild shouting, the Sheriff gave a signal and the deputies deployed through
the crowd, shoving and poking anyone without a white armband, toward
Ambridge."
When the shooting started, most of the men began to run. Ap-
proximately one hundred were injured, most of them shot in the
back. A stray bullet killed an onlooker on a porch one to three
blocks away. However, the union identified the victim as a picket
named Adam Petrasuski. Mother Bloor spoke at the funeral. Police
violently interfered with people going to the funeral of the man
killed, and two women, Edith Brisker and May Ecker, were ar-
rested when they tried to speak to the crowd.70
Abuse was not limited to pickets, a bread delivery man showed
the extent of municipal control.
I was near Twenty-fourth Street. There were no pickets or strikers
there. A bunch of deputies, not among those who came in from the outside
but from those who were inside shot at me. They were stationed on the
railroad tracks. I did not know what for. I had no stick or anything. I was
just watching from a distance what was happening when the fellows from
the railroad tracks shot at me hitting me in the back ...
When I first came to the hospital I had to hang around in the waiting
room. I was very sick, so I found a bench and lay down. Pretty soon some-
one came to me, I don't know whether he was a doctor or who, I was too
sick to look up. He asked me "where you work?" I was too sick to reply.
The same evening Dr. F.C. Forcey who is on the staff of the Sewickley
Valley hospital and who is also the company physician of the Spang-Chal-
fant Company said to me "You are a red." I said "sure, can't you see all the
blood from my wounds." Then he said "You ought to be shot."
Then Dr. Boruku, the second day when he went to take the bandage off
the wounds, asked me whether I cry. I said no. Then he tore the bandage off
my arms, tearing the hair with it. "You must be tough," he said. Then when
he started taking the bandage off my head he said "We're going to have fun
now." He tried to tear it off. It hurt terribly, tears were rolling down my
eyes, but I said nothing. He could not tear the head bandage off, so he took
the scissors and cut my hair.
When the hospital was built a few years ago every worker in the facto-
69. Social Justice Report, supra note 67, at 3. Compare the official report by the Gover-
nor's Commitee, based on the Sheriff's testimony, "the Sheriff crossed the street by himself
and made a last effort to persuade the pickets to withdraw. The strikers retorted defiantly
and the Sheriff told his men to take the strikers' clubs away. Within a few seconds tear gas
was fired, clubs began to fly, and then buckshot was fired." Governor's Report, supra note
68, at 12.
70. The Massacre in Ambridge 1 Dead, 100 Wounded, STEEL AND MErAL WORKER,
Nov. 1933, at 3.
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ries of this valley gave three days wages towards it."
Other injured men were also interrogated about their work before
treatment.
The next day, three carloads of police patrolled the streets
breaking up groups of three or more at gun point, even on the
steps of their homes. Many were routinely searched. Police raided
the offices of the strikers to arrest several leaders of the strike, car-
rying off records and cash, without warrants. Leaders spent days in
jail until released on habeas corpus. 2 More than twenty men were
fired at Spang-Chalfant. J & L officials approved of this "lesson"
in law enforcement for its own community. In May, 1934, J & L
paid Federal Laboratories Inc. $1,925.60 for riot guns, long range
tear gas projectiles, grenades, and ammunition.
Once the organizing campaign began having an impact in
1935, social control was exercised more concertedly and less
openly. A civic group known as the Committee of 500 was estab-
lished with company funds and the participation of many manage-
ment personnel for the purpose of preventing the anti-American,
foreign influences of unionism. The committee was formed at a
meeting at which the main speaker was F. E. Feiger, Vice-Presi-
dent of J & L, and which included in attendance Harry Saxon,
Superintendent of the Aliquippa works." When asked if he
thought it was a good thing to preserve law and order as in Am-
bridge, where workers were shot, the organizer of the committee, J.
A. Ruffner, also county Republican Chairman, owner of the Ali-
quippa Gazette, and vice president of the J & L land company,
said, "That's the finest thing that was ever done in this valley. '74
Ruffner added, "Why, they were picketing! Men who wouldn't
work! Whenever three or four people gather together and make re-
marks that could be resented by another person, they are inciting
to riot. '7 5 On July 14, 1935, the same day the Committee of 500
was announced, the Aliquippa Gazette ran a page one, boxed re-
production of one of the Committee's pamphlets.
My name is John L. Lewis.. . . I am a bloodsucker.... I must stir up
hatred and violence... I will have in my employ many communists. They
are good 'at violence and bloodshed. You cannot be neutral in this hour of
strife ... The fight is yours, you cannot evade it ... take your place in the
ranks with us, in the movement to show Racketeer Lewis that we have only
71. Social Justice Report, supra note 67, at 5-6.
72. Governor's Report, supra note 68, at 13.
73. Marguerite Young, Steel's G.O.P. Vigilantes, NEw MASSEs, Aug. 4, 1936, at 9, 10.
74. Id. at 11.
75. Id. at 12.
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one answer for him. Mr. John L. Lewis, we do not need you. You are dirty
and the town and citizens of Aliquippa are clean."
A company union, the Employee Representation Plan
("ERP"), was established on June 15, 1933. Management distrib-
uted the bylaws in the plant and workers were forced to vote for it
as the only balloted alternative. Those who refused were disci-
plined, sent home or threatened with discharge. The men "elected"
were allowed to leave work when they wished and turn in whatever
time they wanted to be paid. Clifford Shorts estimated his highest
monthly take at $900. 7 One man turned in 25 hours one day be-
cause of his one hour travel time. The chairman of the ERP was
paid the huge sum of $14,000 per year.
The company's efforts were made easier not only by ownership
of the company town and access to the town itself by transporta-
tion and property ownership, but also by the coincident develop-
ment of the steel industry in the region of Western Pennsylvania."
As each preceding ethnic wave became situated and somewhat or-
ganized, a new group could be brought into the plant and at the
same time isolated in separate housing locations. In the thirties,
southern blacks were recruited often as replacements for more mil-
itant workers invoking the inevitable distrust and mixture of race
issues."e
Geographic ethnic separation mirrored job segregation within
the plant's division of labor. The tin department was worked al-
most exclusively by Welshmen." Italians and Eastern Europeans
worked the open hearths and blooming and butt mills.8 1 Beginning
with a substantial recruitment drive during World War I, the em-
ployment office assigned the worst jobs in all departments to Afri-
can-Americans. While comprising 8% of the workforce in the thir-
ties, 13% of the common laborers were black. In the South Coke
Works, almost all workers unloading coke from the ovens were
black. They had to constantly chew tobacco on the job to clean
their mouths of coke fumes and residues. Almost all of the workers
76. Id. at 10.
77. NLRA Hearings, supra note 1, at 4182 (testimony of Clifford Shorts).
78. On the relationship between work organization and work life in the development of
the steel industry, see JOHN FITCH, THE STEEL WORKaRS (1910); DAVID BRODY, STEELWORK-
ERS IN AMERICA: THE NONUNION ERA (1960); DAVID MONTGOMERY, THE FALL OF THE HousE
OF LABOR (1987); Katherine Stone, The Origins of Job Structures in the Steel Industry, 6
REV. RADICAL POL. ECON. 113 (1974).
79. For the experience of African-Americans in steel, see DENNIS C. DICKERSON, OUT OF
THE CRUCIBLE: BLACK STEELWORKERS IN WESTERN PENNSYLVANIA, 1875-1980 (1986).
80. Harold Ruttenberg, Steeltown, NATION, Nov. 28, 1934, at 624.
81. Interview with Clark Cobb 15 (May 14, 1980) [hereinafter Cobb Interview], in Bea-
ver Valley Labor History Society Papers (on file in Labor Archives, Univ. of Pitt.).
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in the general labor gangs were black. No blacks worked in the
blooming mill or the seamless tube mill. The general superinten-
dent of the seamless mill was rumored to have a clause in his per-
sonal employment contract that stated that blacks would not be
assigned permanent jobs there. He did not want blacks from the
general labor gang to use the restrooms when working the seamless
mill. The only black job in tin was the "pickler," who prepared
rolled steel plates for tinplating by placing them by hand in a foul
smelling acid solution. In the thirties, a few blacks moved into
higher paying skilled jobs as a last resort when not enough white
workers could be found for the most strenuous positions. For ex-
ample, they were given the job of wire drawers who were required
to move heavy rods on their shoulders.82 Supervisory jobs were
closed to blacks until the union."' Clark Cobb worked the same job
in the open hearth for twenty three years.
[Tihey had a few blacks on the lower paying jobs. Cleaning up and the
greasy jobs like that. They stayed at one thing. If one would leave, die or
quit, he would get replaced with another black, but when a promotion went
up, for more money or better working conditions, then that was a white
move because we had no rules to be governed by.8 4
Until 1925, the open hearth worked a twenty four hour turn, with a
twenty minute break every four hours. Men caught sleeping or eat-
ing during work were sent home. Men who did not report were
fetched from home by the foreman. In the summer, many passed
out. To get through, "[s]ome of the old guys would be singing the
old hymns, ya know, sing back in the stables, they be singing that,
some of them they would go on the side and say a little prayer, the
foreman didn't like that."8
Segregation was enforced in the town as well as the plant.
There were no black teachers or store clerks. Some stores kept sep-
arate entrances. The movie house had a black balcony. From the
beginning of its substantial presence in the twenties, the Wood-
lawn Land Co. forced the black population to live in Plan 11 Ex-
tension. Due to their own insecurity, many foreign born workers
supported the twins of job and home segregation. 8 The Klu Klux
Klan openly marched and burned crosses during the twenties.
They attended church services in white areas, speaking to congre-
82. Black Workers at the Aliquippa Works, BEAVER VALLEY LAB. HIST. J., Sept. 1979,
at 5.
83. Cobb Interview, supra note 81, at 15.
84. Cobb Interview, supra note 81, at 13.
85. Cobb Interview, supra note 81, at 23.
86. See generally DicKERSON, supra note 79.
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gations and making donations. To counter the Klan, in 1923, a for-
mer J & L laborer and grocer, Matthew Dempsey, organized a
chapter of Marcus Garvey's Universal Negro Improvement Associ-
ation ("UNIA"). Meetings, usually of fifty mostly mill workers,
were held secretly behind closed curtains in his grocery concealed
from the agents of Captain Mauk. 7 Nonetheless, through stool pi-
geons, some identified members were fired and run out of town,
despite the proud claims of Superintendent of the Aliquippa
Works, Tom Girdler, that he had run the Klan out of Aliquippa.
The harrassment of Dempsey and UNIA members was due to a
larger effort co-run by J & L Police Chief Harry Mauck and the
F.B.I. special agent in charge of the investigation against Garvey-
ism in Western Pennsylvania. The Reverend W. W. Johnson, pas-
tor of the Emmanuel African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church in
Aliquippa, complained to the agent that many of the town's 1,500
African Americans, mostly J & L workers, belonged to the congre-
gation, but only about 100 still attended as a result of Garvey's
influence. Shortly thereafter, the discharge of UNIA members led
to the disbanding of the organization.""
In the face of a community so totally organized and rational-
ized by the needs of the production process, workers established
whatever autonomy they could. Each new group took care of its
own as much as possible. Initially, this was made necessary by lan-
guage and housing. Each ethnic group built a hall in its Plan for
social occasions, weddings and picnics. The Italians, the largest
single group during most of the period, held a huge annual celebra-
tion of San Rocco Day. Ethnic organizations flourished, and would
later become a highly organized network of communications for the
union organizers. The Steel Workers Organizing Committee issued
a broadside for a Mass Meeting at the Lithuanian Hall, January
31, 1937, with speakers in Polish, Lithuanian, Russian, Serbian,
Croatian and other languages. The meeting was endorsed by the
Croatian Fraternal Union, National Slovak Society, Grand Carni-
olian Slovenian Catholic Union, Slovak Evangelical Union, Inter-
national Workers Order, Supreme Lodge of Lithuanians of
America, Cooperative Distributors, Inc., Slovak Gymnastic Union
Sokol, Workmen's Sick and Death Benefit Fund, Federation of
Croatian Clubs, Slovak League of America, United Ukranian Toil-
ers, South Slavonic Catholic Union, Association of Lithuanian
Workers, Greek Workers Educational Federation, American Lithu-
anian Workers Literary Association, Workmen's Sick Benefit Asso-
87. Matthew L. Dempsey, BEAVER VALLEY LAB. HIST. J., June, 1979, at 4.
88. DicKERSON, supra note 79, at 82.
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ciation, Lemko Association 5th District, Western Pennsylvania
Federation Slovene National Benefit Society, and Russian Brother-
hood Association of U.S.A. 9
ORGANIZING ALIQUIPPA
We are free Americans. We shall exercise our inalienable rights to or-
ganize into a great industrial union, banded together with all our fellow
steelworkers. Through this union we will win higher wages, shorter hours,
and better standards of living... We shall make real the dreams of the
pioneers who pictured America as a land where all might live in comfort and
happiness."
Sporadic organizing attempts failed until the Depression. The
very same isolation that eased the task of social control in flush
times and bred community self-organization of workers against lo-
cal exigency, now served to focus the realities of layoffs, slowdowns
and alienation threatening the only real compensation to life in the
company town - relative job security and break even debt man-
agement with company housing and the company store. By the
mid-1930s, workers were sometimes working only two days every
fortnight, not enough for subsistence, and certainly the source of
outrage when the company played rank favoritism among the men
and women competing for such little paid time. The lifeblood of
the wage and the security of the community were simultaneously
being destroyed and there was no quid pro quo available from the
company to lead workers to go along anymore. Thus, the relation-
ship of production and community structure again created the con-
ditions for organization which had been so thoroughly opposed
and, on necessary occasion, brutally repressed.
Other agencies, outside union organizers with experience in
mine work, and a sympathetic state government intervened and
were necessary catalysts."1 But to explain, first, why the shift to
organization was so complete within three years in a whole commu-
nity, and second, how J & L which had escaped the 1919 strike so
completely, should now organize so quickly as opposed to the
bloody summer facing the rest of Little Steel, it seems necessary to
focus on what made Aliquippa extreme - its company status.2
89. Steel Workers Organizing Committee Handbill announcing Jan. 31 Mass Meeting,
in Beaver Valler Labor History Society Papers (on file in Labor Archives, Univ. of Pitt.)
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The isolation of the town made mobility in or out difficult. J &
L paid the wages set by U.S. Steel. But jobs were obtained through
nepotism or membership in the Republican Party. Some youths
got their jobs by displaying sports jerseys of the team sponsored by
the J & L police chief.9 3 The foremen ran fiefdoms requiring kick
backs for continued employment. Finally, in 1929, J & L police ar-
rested Foreman E. K. Griffith for extorting more than $10,000.
The Griffith's exposure was long delayed because almost all of the men
under him were foreigners, many of whom can barely talk English. The ma-
jority of them live in company houses which they are either renting or in
which they have tied up their savings of years. Being fired by the Jones and
Laughlin Company would mean that their only source of income - Aliquippa
is a one industry town - would go, and they would be evicted from their
homes when the month's rent was up or when the next installment was
due.9 4
Griffith pled guilty, was fined $300, and given one year in the
county workhouse, but was not required to pay back any money to
the men .
When the Great Crash hit, favoritism still prevailed as the
company laid off skilled workers and rehired them after a few days
as common laborers at $.40 an hour. In one week in May, between
1500 and 2000 were laid off.9 6 During the union drive, the company
generated much resentment by hiring teenage Republicans when
there was so little work for the older men.
Low pay, infrequent work, and favoritism in advancement ac-
companied labor cost and technological changes. In 1936, steel paid
common laborers 47.9 cents an hour, or $3.76 per day, compared to
62 cents per hour for common laborers in mining. The weekly pay
of $16.77 ranked twentieth out of twenty-one industries listed by
the National Industrial Conference Board. Hourly earnings over-
all averaged 65.6 cents compared to an average of approximately
80 cents in coal, petroleum, and construction. This amount in-
cluded two pay increases in steel over the two previous years in
town, subsequent histories have largely relied on ROBERT R.R. BROOKS, As STEEL GOES 110-
29 (1940), including those of Cortner, Bernstein, and T. Brooks. Many of the same events
are described in this section, with reliance on Brooks noted.
93. Colonna Interview, supra note 56, at 6.
94. Joseph Dallet Jr., Swindle Boss Reign Ended, FEDERATED PRESS, May 28, 1929, re-
printed in BEAVER VALLEY LAB. HIST. J., May 1980, at 6.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. John L. Lewis, Industrial Democracy in Steel 11 (NBC radio address delivered by
John L. Lewis, President of the United Mine Workers and Chairman of the Committee for
Industrial Organization, on July 6, 1936 reprinted in CIO pamphlet).
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order to forestall increased organization. In 1936, a new continuous
strip mill replaced 1400 men with 60 to 75 men over eleven
months. 150 union member "chippers" were bumped to part time
laborers by a new chipping machine. Skilled workers, the old
"Aristocrats of Steel" were deskilled. A threading machine opera-
tor making $8 to $9 per day on tonnage prior to 1931, made $4.40
per day in 1936, no higher than some laborers on piece rates.9
Laid off workers were at the mercy of the Republican con-
trolled local administration. The town's Republican administration
refused to let the Works Progress Administration or Public Works
Administration projects into the area. Those who were still on J &
L's payroll could report to work for a month or more without re-
ceiving one day's work. In Aliquippa, 44% of the city's workforce
were in part-time employment in early 1934.91 Sometimes the fore-
men would tell men to go to the train station to pick up a bag of
government flour. In exchange for food at the rate of $.50 a day,
mill workers on the company payroll were placed in public works
projects, the main work being the expansion of the superinten-
dent's private golf course and the improvement of the road leading
to it. The workers named the road "Hoover Boulevard." 100 Work-
ers put in an eight hour day on the golf course or improving Ali-
quippa High School's football field. Sometimes 100 to 150 men
worked at a time. Frank Kromerich worked three days to pay for a
$1.50 prescription for his daughter. 101 J & L also ran a ferry to Cow
Island, a small, uninhabited island in the Ohio River, where it al-
lowed under-employed workers and their families to plant small
vegetable gardens.
The precursors to union organizing started in the tin mills. In-
side the huge building, 32 mills operated with nine man crews.
Every 30 minutes a run of 40, 30 pound bars were heated and
rolled 12 times to produce 160 long sheets of tin. Considered the
hardest work in the plant, each turn lasted only eight hours rather
than the 10 to 12 in the rest of the plant. "The heat from the fur-
naces was so unbearable . . . that workers needed special wooden
shoes to keep from burning their feet. Fifty-four additional work-
ers, called 'floaters', were needed on each turn to help or replace
98. Letter from Harold Ruttenberg to John Brophy (July 17, 1936), in Eilickson Pa-
pers, Box 16, File 17 (on file with the Labor Archives, Reuther Library, Wayne State
University).
99. DAUGHERTY r AL., supra note 32, at 890.
100. Roots of Beaver Valley Lodge # 200, A.A.LS. & T.W: Part II, BEAVER VALLEY LAB.
HIsT. J., July, 1981, at 1. See also Colonna Interview, supra note 56, at 8.
101. Interview with Frank Kromerich 1-4 (Sept. 13, 1978), in Beaver Valley Labor His-
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any of the 288 regularly assigned workers who became weakened or
totally incapacitated by the heat.' 10 2 When the tin mills were being
staffed in the early 'teens, mostly English speaking workers, Welsh
(called goats), English, Irish, and Scottish, were hired. Many had
been Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers,
who had lost their jobs in a fourteen month strike lost in New Cas-
tle, Pennsylvania in 1909. These workers signed "yellow dog" don-
tracts, pledging not to join or remain union members. Pay was by
the skill of the job. The best jobs of rougher and roller went to
English speakers. The foreign born could only hope to rise to the
demanding heater job. Blacks were not permitted to work in the
tin mills. Only English workers could rent or buy houses on Plan
12.
The first vestiges of organized resistence followed the end of
World War I, when tin workers refused to buy company sponsored
liberty bonds. The workers complained that their pay had not kept
pace with wartime inflation while the Steel companies made huge
war profits, and there "was no democracy in Woodlawn." J & L
believed this affront to be the result of internal agitation. Agitating
in the mill, according to company officials, started with any in-
crease in communication, including the mail received at home.
Finns were thought to be pro-union because they were intelligent,
visited each other, met in cellars in their own homes and got more
mail and newspapers than other "foreigners."103
The Company broke this resistance by making an example of Woodlawn's
Finnish workers. In the Tin Mill, the general foreman ordered rollers,
roughers and heaters to attack Finnish Tin Mill workers as they left the Tin
Mill. The Finns were taken to the river banks, stripped naked, and tarred
and feathered. Finally, they were told that they were fired and had 24 hours
to leave Woodlawn.1'"
No organizing activity took place in Woodlawn during the Great
Steel Strike of 1919. During the 1920s, a handful of tin workers
secretly belonged to the Amalgamated, but these few told the In-
ternational's spotters that there was no hope of open activity.
The final union organization drive can be divided roughly into
the AFL and the CIO periods. The drive began in 1933 when two
veteran UMW organizers, Frank Dobbins and John Mayer, were
sent into Aliquippa. Both were beaten, arrested, denied housing in
town and gave up without making any progress. Mayer was ar-
102. Roots of Beaver Valley Lodge 200, Amalgamated Associated [sic] of Iron, Steel
and Tin Workers 1909 - 1929, BEAVER VALLEY LAB. HisT. J., Mar., 1979, at 1.
103. EDWARD LEviNSON, LABOR ON THE MARCH 202 (1938).
104. Dallet, supra note 94, at 5.
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rested along with his attacker and fined $5.00, the same as his at-
tacker, by Justice of the Peace J.M. Kane. The Company's attor-
ney, also his representative, paid the attacker's fine. In July 1934,
operating out of necessity across the river in Ambridge, AFL and
United Mine Workers organizer John Tafelski gathered fifteen
supporters of the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel and Tin
Workers to petition for a charter. The Amalgamated's constitution
required that a charter be issued whenever at least ten men as a
unit requested affiliation as a lodge. Almost all were workers in the
tin mill. Tafelski picked the officers - Harry Phillips, President;
Angelo Volpe, Vice-President; B.S. McDonald, Recording Secre-
tary; James A. Dunn, Treasurer; Andrew Smith, Guide; Allen
James, Inside Guide; and E.L. Pander, Outside Guide. On August
4, 1934, Joe Dunn drove Harry Phillips to the AA International
office to pick up the charter for Beaver Valley Lodge #200. Ser-
geant Donnelly, a J & L plainclothesman followed them.05 The
day after getting the lodge charter, Phillips was offered a job by
Captain Harris of the J & L police if he would quit.
The charter generated action. Two hundred men joined the
lodge. As the membership grew to include men from all parts of
the plant, the ethnic shape of the union rapidly changed. Still
without an office, authorization cards were surreptitiously solicited
in the Italian neighborhood meeting places: Tony Ferro's barber
shop and Angelo Roma's pool hall. Nino Colonna cut through back
streets, doubling back to the bus stop below Plan 11, with signed
cards in his underwear, to deliver them to Tafelski in Ambridge.1' 6
The precautions were not unrealistic. Tafelski's associate, Walter
Payne, arrived just before the first open meeting for J & L work-
ers, held in a vacant lot in Ambridge, on September 8th. He no-
ticed plenty of armed plainclothes Jones & Laughlin police attend-
ing.107 After a meeting with Volpe, Brandy, Cox and others at
Harry Phillips house, Payne and two others were stopped by a mo-
torcycle borough policeman, and directed to the police station
without explanation other than "Drive in; you will soon find out."
The car search turned up nothing, so the men were ordered with-
out charge into the station, "Get inside and you will soon find
out." Two muscular officers, one plainclothes and one uniformed,
took off their coats and shirts, picked up clubs and stood on each
side of the prisoners during the questioning by Chief Ambrose.
They were eventually released on the ground they had been mis-
105. Roots of Beaver Valley Lodge # 200, A.A.LS. & T.W.: Part II, BEAVER VALLEY
LAB. HisT. J., July, 1981, at 8.
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taken for a bald-headed, communistic organizer from Clairton
[Tafelski].108
The Company was prepared should organization succeed to
any extent. Clinton Golden's investigation uncovered a company
inspector, who feared his identity would be disclosed, who reported
that there
are enough supplies stored in the J. & L., plant to run for weeks. Arms,
ammunition, tear gas bombs, riot guns etc., to equal a U.S. Arsenal. One
large bay in the plant is equipped with beds while another is stored with
kitchen utensels, all guarded by company police to keep employees away
until such time as trouble might arise when the employees would be ex-
pected to remain in the plant.10
9
At one of the first meetings, the Lodge elected Albert Atallah
to replace Harry Phillips as president. Nothing emerged publicly,
for Phillips' courage was highly regarded, but rumors suggested a
problem with alcohol.110 Phillips continued to be active in organiz-
ing, becoming one of the discharged workers in the test case. Two
weeks later his wife penned a false suicide note and hid at a neigh-
bors, explaining that labor activities "'have made life miserable
and I was tired of being an outcast. Every place my children and I
went, we were mocked, and I wanted that to end.' "i'
In the fall of 1934, union activity in Aliquippa became very
locally influenced. Organization was not top down. Union ferment
occurred throughout the steel and coal valleys of Western Pennsyl-
vania.1 1 2 Some workers had attended meetings of the radical and
communist influenced Sheet Metal and Iron Workers Union which
had organized the Ambridge Strike, and held meetings during 1933
with dissident AA locals objecting to the quiescent leadership of
Mike Tighe. The rank and file steel worker leaders, Clarence Irwin,
William Spang, Mel Moore, Roy Halas and Lewis Morris, were
part of the Committee of Ten authorized by the AA 1934 conven-
tion to coordinate a national strike. Within the AFL generally, a
new group, the radical AFL Rank and File Committee for Unem-
ployment Insurance and Relief, appeared nationally and in Penn-
108. Id. at 138-39.
109. An Inspectors's Story, in Clinton Golden Papers (on file in Historical Collections
and Labor Archives, Pattee Library, Penn. State Univ., University Park, Pa.).
110. Interview with Dominic Del Turco 9 (n.d.) [hereinafter Del Turco Interview], in
Beaver Valley Labor History Society Papers (on file in Labor Archives, Univ. of Pitt.).
111. Wife, Playing Second Fiddle to Union, Gives Mate a "Jolt", Pirr. PRESS, June 9,
1936.
112. On the development of the radical rank and file in steel generally, see Staughton
Lynd, The Possibility of Radicalism in the Early 1930's: The Case of Steel, in WORKER'S
STRUGGLES, PAST AND PRESENT: A "RADIcAL AMERICA" 190-208 (James Green ed., 1983).
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sylvania.113 Originally formed to push the voluntarist AFL old
guard to support unemployment insurance based on a true social
wage administered by worker councils, the Lundeen Bill, the Rank
and File Committee expanded its focus to all facets of mass indus-
trial organization. For example, Pittsburgh steel worker and orga-
nizer Roy Halas was also involved with Lundeen. The committee,
whose president in 1935 was Harry Bridges, constituted a left pres-
sure, pushing organized labor toward what became the CIO schism.
Their demands for rank and file organizing of industrial unions ap-
pealed to many alienated workers in the company towns. In its pa-
per, the AFL Rank and File Federationist, editorial articles urged
a break from the AFL. "The steel campaign will be delayed and
sabotaged by the A.F. of L. Executive Council because the Interna-
tional officials are out to dismember the steel workers' union into
many different craft unions.M 1 4
Meanwhile, in September, 1934, the National Steel Labor Re-
lations Board investigated charges of intimidation made by Beaver
Valley Lodge #200. Clinton Golden compiled reports for the
Board. A number of statements convinced him to report to his
superiors of a pattern of police retaliation for union activity.
From such information as I was able to gather on the 5th and again
today, there appears to be plenty of evidence to sustain the Union charges
of intimidation and coercion on the part of the Company officials in inter-
fering with the rights of employees to organize as provided for in Section 7A
of the NRA. It appears that in addition to the extensive private police force
maintained by the Company, there also exists an extensive espionage sys-
tam whereby practically every move and act of any of its employees whether
at work or after working hours, was at once made known to company
officials.
As an instance of this I saw a list of 35 names of alleged stool pigeons in
the employ of the company. Of this number 7 were Croatians, 14 Serbians
and the balance of various other nationalities. This would seem to indicate
that it is the policy to plant informers among each racial or national
group.1
15
In one episode, a union member living in Ambridge was con-
tinually threatened as he tried to return home from a meeting with
113. On the history of the AFL Rank and File Committee, and the CIO, see Kenneth
Casebeer, Unemployment Insurance: American Social Wage, Labor Organization and Le-
gal Ideology, 35 B. C. L. REv. 259 (1994).
114. Labor Must Back Steel Workers, RANK AND FME FEDERATIONIST, Mar.-Apr. 1935,
at 9.
115. Letter from Clinton S. Golden (Oct. 6, 1934), in Clinton Golden Papers (on file in
Historical Collections & Labor Archives, Pattee Library, Penn. State Univ., University Park,
Pa.).
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several union officers. After several calls to the state police, Mc-
Donald was led to a "machine" carrying the Burgess, a police ser-
geant and another policeman. The ride home was spent persuading
McDonald to drop out of the union. Others received less subtle
treatment. Captain Harris and Lieutenant Kelly of the company
police went to Joe Latone's home and warned: "If he and the rest
of the dagoes do not quit organizing the men they will run all the
c- s- out of town and you rotten s- of b- s will be the
first to go. J & L wants you to get busy among the g- d-- dagoes
and run them g- d-- rats off'"" Captain Harris confronted Jack
Moses,
there are about 40 Greek families living in Aliquippa and J & L will chase
them out if they attend these meetings.. . . stay with the company instead
of with those s-- of b- robbers and the Company will do more [for] you
than they will.. . . [G]et around and talk to the Greeks, Syrians and dagoes
and talk against the union.1 "
On August 29, Captain Mauk and Burgess Sohn called a meeting
in front of Tony Ferro's Barber Shop, a gathering place for union
members. Mauk's first words to about 200 gathered there were
[y]ou black handed mothers and s--b-- s I am here to tell you if you
don't soon try and bust this association of the Amalgamated we are going to
bust you people up.. . . J & L Co. does not like an outside union and will
close their plant before they will recognize them so get busy and drive these
grafters out of town. Do you people know that baldheaded organizer [Tefel-
ski] at Ambridge is working hand in hand with those G -D- reds that
started the riot at Ambridge and you dagoes ought to be thankful that the J
& L Co., allows you to remain in this town.118
The Company blamed the union for violence. Borough Police
Chief Ambrose pointed out to Golden the case of William French,
an African-American who claimed that union member Joe Pucci
assaulted him with a pipe when he refused to sign a card. Pucci
was arrested and fined. Golden had doubts. The six foot French
towered over the 120 lb. Pucci. Pucci was drinking with four
friends during part of the time the alleged incident took place.
Pucci's home had been raided without a warrant while he was gone
earlier in the day by borough police who confiscated signed union
cards. Pucci was brought into French's hospital room before
French picked Pucci out of a police line-up. Judge Walter Stacy,
116. Report on Joe Latone, in Clinton Golden Papers (on file in Historical Collections
and Labore Archives, Pattee Library, Penn. State Univ., University Park, Pa.).
117. Id.
118. Id.
[Vol. 43
ALIQUIPPA
presiding over the Steel Labor Board hearing, struck French's
testimony. 119
In October, J & L workers led by Albert Atallah went to
Washington to testify at the hearings of the Steel Labor Board.
Fearing for their safety when the proceedings were postponed, they
contacted the Democratic governor's office. Eight state police of-
ficers were sent to Aliquippa and established headquarters at the
Woodlawn Hotel. They came from the Butler Barracks because the
brother of Captain Mauck of the J & L police was captain of a
nearer barracks. Not coincidentally, the first open union meeting
was held October 14, with the governor's wife, Cornelia Byrne
Pinchot, speaking. 120 Still, the Company had men with manual ma-
chine guns in second floor windows of the hotel.121 The Steel Labor
Board held hearings in Pittsburgh on November 16, 1934. The
Board dismissed the complaint in January 11, 1935, acting on as-
surances by J & L that they would instruct the company police to
cease surveillance of union members. J & L President S. E. Sackett
declared that "[t]he policy of the company [toward representation]
is to receive anyone that wishes to come to talk to us on labor
conditions or problems, whether or not he represents himself or is
represented by an organization, and it is not the policy of the cor-
poration to keep anybody out of Aliquippa in any way whatso-
ever." Yet, Phillips, Gerstner, Volpe and Dunn had all testified to'
harrassment by J & L police, and all were fired within the year of
1935, becoming complainants in the NLRB proceedings. The
Amalgamated's petition for rehearing generated a document from
the Pennsylvannia Department of Labor requesting a supervised
election. In its documentation, Christopher Cunningham, J & L
employee and deacon in the "colored Baptist Church," was visited
by Captain Mauk who reportedly said that
now we want you-to get busy on those black bastards and stop them from
joining the union. If you black sons of bitches want a job at the J. & L. mill,
you will have to help the company break up this organization or we will
send all you black bastards back south. 2
The AFL Rank and File Committee called a mass meeting of
steel worker unionists to take place on February 3, 1935, in Pitts-
burgh. An estimated 100 to 400 representatives attended, including
119. Id.
120. Harold J. Ruttenberg, Steeltown, NATION, Nov. 28, 1934, at 623. 4,000 people at-
tended. Id.
121. BODNAR, supra note 25, at 134.
122. Interference With Unionization, Steel - NSLRB Petition for Re-Hearing (1935), in
Beaver Valley Labor History Society Papers (on file in Labor Archives, Univ. of Pitt.).
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men from 78 lodges of the AA. The AFL reacted swiftly. AFL
spokesman David Williams, president of the National Council of
Aluminum Workers, issued the following statement on AFL
stationary:
The "rank and file" group which assumes to threaten a strike in the
Aluminum as well as other large industries, is just a bunch of Communists
acting as agents from Moscow, trying to disrupt the American Labor Move-
ment....
William J. Spang, expelled member of the Amalgamated Association of
Iron, Steel and Tin Workers, has no authority to speak for anyone con-
nected with the American Federation of Labor. He is not entitled to sit in
any Central Labor Union as a delegate, nor participate in any union meet-
ing of any Local Union of any International Union while he is an expelled
member of the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers.1 2 1
Michael Tighe, president of the Amalgamated said, "I have
nothing for Spang and his followers but silent contempt. We have
decided that problem by expelling those insurgents from the
union.' ' 124 One of the chief organizers, Clarence Irwin, wrote to
Harold Ruttenberg, then a free-lance journalist and early intellec-
tual influence on the rank and file movement, in protest one week
before the meeting.
Now suppose we take up the Communistic business first. I think you
know the R & F crowd in the AA well enough to know that we are not
Communists. You have been associated quite intimately with us for long
enough to know that what we want is a strong Union in the Steel Industry.
Imagine calling Mel Moore a "red," he carries "the Red Network" in the
same pocket with his Bible, as for Spang you know he doesn't know enough
about economics to really know what Communism is ...
There may be some Communists in the A.A. I don't know & really I
don't care. What I am interested in is "Unionism." . . . Now for the Red
Scare & those who instigate them, I think for a labor leader (?) to encourage
such a thing is the most contemptible & vicious thing he can do. . . I am
not a C.P. & the other R. & F. fellows in the A.A. are not. So that's that.
Certainly it is no part of my plans to flout the A.F. of L. I agree that we will
need all the help we can get if we are to be even moderately successful.
S.. but we can't afford to simply remain idle in the hope that the A.F. of
L. will do something as it is by no means sure that they will. While I do
not want to be expelled from the A.F. of L., let us look at all it means to be
in the A.A.. . . [t]he new lodges have never been in, not in the sense of
equality... Can you imagine [Tighe] telling the new lodges that it is only a
waste of time & money to even present their wage & hour negotiations in
123. Steel Misc. Clippings 1934-37 (n.d.) [hereinafter Steel Misc. Clippings], in Beaver
Valley Labor History Society Papers (on ifie in Labor Archives, Univ. of Pitt.).
124. Text of Union Leaders Attack on Reds, in Steel Misc. Clippings, supra note 123.
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the program of business at the Con[vention]. 12 5
Clarence Irwin and William Spang frequently spoke at lodge meet-
ings in Aliquippa.126
The day before the rank and file conference, two of the Inter-
national's officers came to an Aliquippa Lodge meeting to dissuade
attendance. Despite the warnings, Attalah and Lodge #200 mem-
bers attended the conference.
On February 3, Sergeant Donnelly, and other J & L police
watched the loading of two busses of Lodge members going to the
Rank and File meeting. He reappeared at the entrance to the
meeting. The 78 lodges, including #200, were expelled even though
they represented the overwhelming majority of the Amalgamated
membership.1 27 J & L immediately forgot the Steel Labor Board
agreement reached four months earlier. Clinton Golden, then a
state labor mediator while also the regional representative of the
Federal Steel Labor Board, reported that,
Lodge #200 did participate and was represented by a large delegation
of members. The charter of the lodge was then revoked. It appears that
following public announcement of this action, complaints as to interference,
espionage etc., took place. While I have no actual facts at hand, it seems to
me that the expulsion of this Lodge was interpreted to mean that its officers
and members were more or less dangerous radicals and that they therefore
had no rights which they had formerly enjoyed.'2 8
Atallah insisted that,
the only thing we wanted was an organization - no more; no less. Although
it may be that among the ranks we had going along with us, there may be
Communists, maybe that, but we weren't interested in that.12 9 All we
wanted was more organization, period. Nothing else. Here I had a large or-
125. Letter from Clarence Irwin, labor organizer, to Harold Ruttenberg (Jan. 23, 1935)
(on file at Penn. Historical Collections and Labor Archives, Pattee Library, Penn. State
University, University Park, Pa.).
126. Interview with Tony Riccitelli 32 (Nov. 9, 1978) [hereinafter Riccitelli Interview],
in Beaver Valley Labor History Society Papers (on file in Labor Archives, Univ. of Pitt.).
127. Lynd, supra note 109, at 201. At the 1934 AA Pittsburgh convention, the expelled
lodges held a rump meeting, claiming to represent 50,000 workers in the large plants, while
the regular convention represented only the 5000 members in the sheet and tin plate, and
puddling mills. DAUGHERTY ET AL., supra note 32, at 967.
128. Letter from Clinton Golden, State Labor Mediator, to Clarence Moser, Director,
Bureau of Mediation (Mar. 7, 1935) (on file at Penn. Historical Collections and Labor
Archives, Pattee Library, Penn. State University, University Park, Pa.).
129. "[S]o-called 'rank-and-file' native white district leaders ... worked with the left-
wing unionists, not because they espoused the fundamentals of communism but because the
left-wing leaders during those months were the only group with a complete, carefully drawn,
hope-inspiring plan for organizing the industry." DAUGHERTY ET AL., supra note 32, at 937.
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ganization and I had nowhere to go. I tried to have a meeting with the com-
pany at one time where one of the vice presidents laughed in our faces. Hal
Ha! Ha!130
On February 10, at an open meeting in the Polish Hall on
Plan 11, between 20 to 25 mill foremen from all over the mill stood
outside watching all the workers who went into the meeting. Don-
nelly was also there. Many frightened members were deterred.
Similar surveillance took place at district meetings in Ambridge
and Braddock. At the same time, Golden reported an increasing
number of attacks by "negroes" upon white mill workers, particu-
larly on Plan 11 where the Italian section abutted the Extension
built for black workers. If arrested, African-American workers were
taken before Squire Hayward, and with company police officers
present, the prisoners were discharged. At the Steel Labor Board
hearings, Golden noted that few African-American workers had
joined the union and that there appeared to be a systematic at-
tempt by the Company to create racial friction.131 In other areas of
Western Pennsylvania, Clarence Irwin was fired, Hank Reamer,
the rank and file leader in Massillon was fired, and George Evans,
the president of the Weirton locals was fired. 3 2 Golden later hired
Clarence Irwin to run the SWOC campaign at Sharon-Farrell.
When the expelled lodges were denied credentials to the next
AA convention, they sued in federal court and were granted an in-
junction requiring that they be reinstated with all rights and privi-
leges.133 Whereupon, the AA demanded all back dues for the sus-
pension period. Atallah met with the International Secretary
Treasurer Leonard claiming that the lodge records had been lost.
An agreement established the arbitrary number of members at 800
130. Interview with Albert Atallah 12 (Sept. 20, 1967) [hereinafter Atallah Interview]
(on file at Penn. Historical Collections and Labor Archives, Pattee Library, Penn. State
University, University Park, Pa.).
131. Letter from Clinton Golden, State Labor Mediator, to Clarence Moser, Director,
Bureau of Mediation (Mar. 7, 1935) (on fie at Penn. Historical Collections and Labor
Archives, Pattee Library, Penn. State University, University Park, Pa.).
132. Ruttenberg reported these developments dispassionately. His own sympathies
were anti-communist, reporting, admittedly without evidence, that he believed Irwin to be a
party member. This was less than two months after Irwin's denial to him in which Irwin
blamed his own reputation on his association with Ruttenberg himself. He wrote of Irwin's
pamphlet "The Progressive Steel Worker" that it "now has a section for Negroes and other
indications of Communist influence." Letter from Harold Ruttenberg (Mar. 28, 1935) (on
file at Penn. Historical Collections and Labor Archives, Pattee Library, Penn. State Univer-
sity, University Park, Pa.). It is true that the Communist Party union efforts, almost exclu-
sively of other organizations, paid great attention to organizing African-American workers in
the early 1930's.
133. Riverside Lodge No. 164 v. Amalgamated Assoc. of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers,
13 F. Supp. 873 (W.D. Pa. 1935).
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for the purpose of reinstating the lodge. Various stories surrounded
the disappearance of the books. Some felt that they were hidden
from the International. Others believed that they had been stolen
by a plant. Eddie Monahan had been elected vice president in the
second lodge election. Less than a year later he disappeared after
having been seen in the plant in a suit and tie, admitting to a sus-
picious union member that he worked for Burns or Pinkerton.
Further evidence of the local character of organization during
this period comes from the conscious tying of unionism with polit-
ics. In late 1934, it was the lodge which set up the Democratic So-
cial Club. An early AA activist, Dominic Del Turco, called it the
political arm of the union movement in Aliquippa.134 Angelo Volpe,
vice president of the Lodge was the first president of the club,
Mike Kellar was secretary, Dominic Brandy was financial secre-
tary, Tony Riccatelli, assistant financial secretary of the Lodge,
was trustee, and other activists occupied key positions. When Kel-
lar became president in 1936, the club moved its offices to the sec-
ond floor of the Roumanian Hall on Kiehl Street. Individuals who
were afraid to walk into the SWOC offices on Hopewell Avenue
would hand SWOC pledge cards to Kellar in his Democratic Social
Club second floor office.' 35 In 1935, Volpe ran for constable, losing
closely. Steel workers needed protection to be more effective.
The burgess and the Council were all appointed by the company. No
one dared run against them, so you may as well say they were appointed.
They ran the town for the company. Now, if you're going to fight the com-
pany on a union basis, the cops in town are going to harass you to stop you
from organizing. They'll raid your house and plant moonshine in your
house, something of that nature. So we had to go into politics.8 8
In 1936, Aliquippa voted Democratic for president for the first
time ever.
During the hearings on the Wagner Act, the J & L ERP sent
representatives, led by William Westlake, to testify that 90% of
the employees at Aliquippa supported the company union. Albert
Atallah, Tony Riccitelli, Tom Bresnin, and Mike Kellar piled into
John Fiola's Cadillac and drcve all night to reach Washington D.C.
134. The Aliquippa Democratic-Social Club 1934-1936, BEAVER VALLEY LAB. HIST. J.,
Mar., 1979, at 2.
135. Id. at 6.
136. Interview with Louis DeSenna, quoted in Eric Davin, The Littlest New Deal:
SWOC Takes Power in Steeltown, a Possibility of Radicalism in the Late 1930s at 49 (n.d.)
(unpublished manuscript on file in Labor Archives, Univ. of Pitt.). Davin believes that polit-
ical resistance and change preceded and was necessary to unionization in Aliquippa. I prefer
to see in his argument the more general struggle, also bottom up from the community, in-
cluding a conscious tying of elections in the plant and in the town.
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When they arrived at the Senate Office Building, they were told
the schedule had been filled. But old Tom Bresnin had worked in
mines with Philip Murray years before. Murray got them in. Atal-
lah told the senators that the ERP claims were false. When a sena-
tor challenged him for proof, Tony Riccitelli opened a suitcase and
dumped 9,000 pledge cards on the long hearing table, proudly tell-
ing them, "now you can pick any card you want and you'll find
that they're all signed by members of J and L."'13 7 Westlake was
not re-elected as ERP Representative.3 8
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Despite the passage of the Wagner Act, and indeed the Na-
tional Industrial Recovery Act before that, J & L increasingly dis-
charged union activists, firing over 100 between June, 1935 and
January, 1937. Thirteen of those fired between July, 1935 and Jan-
uary, 1936, became the plaintiffs in the J & L NLRB case, charging
unfair labor practices under sections 8(1) and 8(3) of the Wagner
Act, interference with organization for mutual aid and protection,
and retaliation for engaging in union activities. Following the re-
gional investigation by Clinton Golden and Board Regional Attor-
ney Thomas Kleeb, the NLRB filed charges in January 1936.
When the hearings began on March 2, 1936 in Court Room #6 of
the Post Office Building in Pittsburgh, counsel for the board began
by providing a detailed statistical picture of J & L's vast and far
flung operations in order to establish that J & L's labor relations
were part of and impacted on interstate commerce. J & L attorney
Earl Reed, appeared solely for the purpose of constitutionally ob-
jecting to the board's jurisdiction. Reed had prepared a 132 page
"brief," entitled "Report on the Constitutionality of the National
Labor Relations Act," for the National Lawyers Committee of the
American Liberty League, a point group in the legal attacks on the
New Deal. Reed counseled that when a lawyer advised a law to be
unconstitutional, clients need not obey.139 After appearing specially
on jurisdiction, he took no part in the hearing, and therefore, did
not cross-examine any of the Board's witnesses on the unfair labor
practices.
With respect to the specific complaints relating to employees, the respon-
dent takes the position that it is the sole judge of the right to hire and fire,
and that it is not subject to the Board in that respect, and, therefore, de-
clines to offer any testimony on that subject and withdraws from the
137. Riccitelli Interview, supra note 126, at 35-36.
138. CORTNER, THE JONES & LAUGHLIN CASE 82 (1970).
139. IRONS, supra note 21, at 245.
658 [Vol. 43
ALIQUIPPA
hearing. 40
The company took the position in their brief that the cases had all
been fairly investigated and the men were discharged for cause.
Martin Gerstner, the first financial secretary for Lodge #200,
took the stand first among the fired workers. A motor inspector, he
had been employed at Jones & Laughlin less than six years.
Gerstner's house was watched 24 hours a day. J & L Sergeant Don-
nelly and Officer Slater followed him everywhere. An employment
agent noted everyone who entered or left the house. In September,
1934, Gerstner was evicted from his house for no reason, and J & L
policemen followed Gerstner to where he was moving in Ambridge.
In the summer of 1935, Gertsner's time was kept down. Gerstner
was discharged on Monday evening in December, 1935 because a
nut fell off a crane. The nut had fallen off at one o'clock on Sunday
afternoon, and three other motor inspectors-Linde, Bevington,
and Lang-had their shifts after Gerstner's last duty. None of the
others were disciplined.14
The first lodge president, Harry Phillips, a motor inspector in
the soaking pits, testified second. On July 13, Phillips asked his
foreman for a day off to attend the Democratic Social Club picnic.
Foreman Walter Gray responded no, but told him that he would
have lots of time to go to picnics in the future. On July 20, after
fixing three machines, Phillips took his lunch. He then stopped in
the wash room to put Vaseline on his hands which were chafed
from the heat from the machines where he had been working. The
warning whistle blew, but he saw his millwright answer it. When
he got there, the man on the pump told him it was okay, they
shared a cigarette and Phillips went to check bolts in the shanty.
The whistle blew again. This time the day foreman was there at
4:00 a.m. Phillips explained that he did not hear the first whistle
and was in the wash room for the second one. Foreman Gray said,
"You fellows coming out at night always want the millwrights to
do all the work around here. . . .You can get the hell out of
here .... You are going to have plenty of time to sell [union] pa-
pers from now on.' 1 42 Phillips had been delivering Amalgamated
papers the night he was black-jacked at the Wye going to work. He
had recently been delivering speeches urging men not to vote in
the company union elections. Although not participating in the
NLRB hearings, the company had replied earlier to a second com-
140. NLRB Record, supra note 6, at 129-30 (argument of Earl Reed, counsel to Jones &
Laughlin, March 2, 1936).
141. Id. at 150-51 (testimony of Martin Gerstner).
142. Id. at 173-74 (testimony of Harry Phillips).
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plaint including the discharging of Phillips, to the National Steel
Labor Relations Board. In their view,
This man was discharged because of inattention to his duties, which
occurred on more than one occasion. It was his business to respond to sig-
nals when electrical equipment was disabled, and on the last occasion he
failed to respond to his signals and could not be found. The signals were
sounded several times and the work of a large number of men was held up
on account of his absence. It was a period of about a half hour before he
could be located, and then gave an untrue excuse for his absence. He
seemed to feel that his position as President of the Union gave him an im-
munity from discipline.14 3
No supporting affidavits or specific evidence were presented.
Phillips' testimony about his assistant indicates that no time was
lost. Phillips was dispossessed from his J & L house shortly there-
after for inability to make his payments. Phillips was married, with
four children. Two weeks before the notice to quit, his wife was
warned by Mr. Leslie of the Woodlawn Land Co. about the union.
Angelo Razzano, one of the leading organizers of the Italian
workers, was next to testify. Hired in 1923 or 1924, Razzano drove
a tractor hauling material. He was married and had five children.
He was a charter member of the union, personally signing up 1500
members and delivering circulars in public. Consequently, the
company marked him. On September 17, John Bolger, general
foreman in the seamless finishing plant, called Razzano to come in
immediately to see Plant Superintendent Fisher. Fisher talked
about the union, recalled Razzano,
He says "Saturday you was in Ambridge at a union meeting?" I says, "Yes."
He says, "Well, what for?" I says, "Don't you know I am an American citi-
zen in here and I am supposed to go where I please." He says, "[B]ut the
Company don's [sic] stand for that.". . . Well, he said. . . "William Green
got beautiful home in Washington, sits on soft chair and everything there,
and you guys pay for that and he never do anything for you." I says, "Well,
I don't know anything about that, but still," I says, "I think this union idea
is mighty good thing in the country. ' '1 4'
On January 13, 1936, John Bolger sent Razzano to another build-
ing to bring back a steel buggy. The route required opening and
closing a door, which Razzano did on both the way up and the way
down. Nonetheless, Bolger came running up to ask him if he could
143. Letter from H.A. Wiley, Chair, National Steel Labor Relations Board, to Albert
Attalah 2 (Sept. 10, 1935) [hereinafter Wiley Letter], in Steel - NSLRB Correspondence,
1934-1935, Beaver Valley Labor History Society Papers (on file in Labor Archives, Univ. of
Pitt.).
144. NLRB Record, supra note 6, at 179-80 (testimony of Angelo Razzano).
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read the sign, "shut the Door," and if he knew what it meant?
"Why didn't you do it?" Razzano replied that he did and Bolger
had seen him do it. Ten minutes later, Bolger returned with an-
other foreman asking, "didn't that man say the same thing last
week?" Razzanno insisted he had, "Last week was cold weather
and if the door was open that man in the mill would freeze to
death. Therefore I closed the door because nobody ever com-
plained about it." Bolger told him to go pick up his time.145 Raz-
zano also testified, however, that it was a common practice for all
drivers to leave the door open from time to time.
Ronald Cox, operator of an electrical overhead hoisting crane
who started in 1928 as a catcher in the tin mills, believed he had
the best safety record among crane men, having received two
watch fobs for his three safety awards, one of which was for crane
work. Of the 22 cranes in the seamless tube department, Cox was
assigned to the hardest one to operate. When he left, the company
had to send to another department to get a man to operate it.
"Well, it is in the 30 inch round mill, and they allow 90 minutes to
change the mill, and they specify something like 85 lifts in 90 min-
utes. That is almost a lift a minute, and a man has to be very ex-
perienced to do that without injuring some one." '146 Cox was a
union kingpin in his department. He recruited, sold tickets, passed
out literature, and helped at organizing in Midland. He watched
himself closely after the first discharges. At the beginning of one
shift, the general foreman, usually in his office with daily assign-
ments, showed up on the floor. Cox inspected his crane. As soon as
he climbed down, the whistle signaled for him to make a lift. Cox
went up and worked his hooks to make a lift, and the foreman who
had followed Cox signaled him to come down. "Did you inspect
your crane?" he asked. Cox replied, "yes." The foreman then
asked, "Did you try your limit stops?" "No, sir," Cox answered.
Cox was told, "Go back and get your check and go home." The
limit stop is an important safety catch to prevent too high a hoist,
dropping the load to the floor. An angry Cox changed and went to
the office. The turn foreman, Krause, saw him and put his back
against the door:
I just pushed the door open and walked into the office, and Mr. Hussy,
the foreman that dismissed me, was talking on the phone, and I got this
much of his conversation: He said, "He didn't try his limit stops. Is that
enough?" Then he looked up and saw me, and he said, "I can't talk to you
145. Id. at 182-84.
146. Id. at 202-03.
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now. Mr. Reaves is on his way," and hung up.117
The next day, when Cox returned to the same office for his time,
the foreman told him, "'Here is your time, Cox. I am going to
make an example of you. He said, Now, you can beat it.' "148
Earlier, just after the union formed in 1934, the general man-
ager of the plant, Mr. Fisher, called Cox into the superintendent's
office for an anti-union talk.
He told me it was a racket; I was just paying my money to a bunch of
big fat guys that sat back and smoked cigars and at the time I was back in
my rent of the company's house, and he told me if I was going to persist in
affiliating myself with this Union, they could not tolerate my back rents,
that they would have to put me out of the house, and the local merchants
would not extend any credit, that he would see to that, that Jones & Laugh-
lin had determined to fight this case to the highest court, and that they
would close the plant down and throw the key in the river before they
would recognize an outside Union; that he had intended to promote me, and
by my affiliating myself with the Union I was not helping my standing. All
the time he was questioning me, he was writing down something. I couldn't
see what he was writing, and he told me, he said, "Cox, any time you change
your mind, come in and tell me, and I will tear this up." So I presume it was
a black-ball.14
When Cox complained before his discharge about being given less
time, he was told he could quit. After his discharge, friends and
workers were afraid to be seen with Cox on the street, but would
stop at his house to tell him he was fighting for the right thing.
Cox, married with one child, held no steady work up to the hear-
ing, selling his furniture to buy food. At the hearing, when asked
why he wanted the union, he testified,
I feel that I could be a better workman, for the reason that there would be a
better atmosphere in the plant. There would not be all of this dissension
that is in there now, and a man could come to work and feel as though he
really wanted to do his job.1"0
Fellow crane operator Martin Dunn worked in the sinter
plant, starting fifteen years earlier as a mail boy and in the tube
and hot mills. He was Harry Phillips' half brother. He was married
with one child, and because of that, continually lied to questioning
superiors that he did not belong to the union. The Company dis-
charged Dunn for forgetting his keys on a workbench after locking
147. Id. at 205-06.
148. Id. at 212.
149. Id. at 208-09.
150. Id. at 215.
[Vol. 43
ALIQUIPPA
the crane. There was a rule in the plant and a sign on the cab that
only cranemen are to enter the crane. All the cranemen left their
keys out from time to time. He was given no reason for discharge,
except, "Nothing personal." In its response to the National Steel
Labor Relations Board, J & L wrote, "This man was discharged for
violation of the safety rules in his operation of a crane. The offense
occurred on two different occasions. On one of them Dunn's action
endangered not only other employees' lives, but his own life." 151
The company did not renew these assertions when discussing
Dunn in their brief to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.5 2
Dominic Brandy worked as a jig man and coal washer for four-
teen years. He started work at J & L in 1910. He signed up 665
members before an office was opened in Aliquippa, and was a
union trustee. He was continually shorted time. After testifying
before the NSLRB, two or three stool pigeons always followed him
outside the plant. J & L discharged Brandy for a bad sample which
was taken from his coal washing. Brandy had worked Saturday, on
Sunday there was no washing, and had worked the second shift on
Monday. A sample was taken Monday. night. An apprehensive
Brandy asked the sample man, Charlie Ross, to check the sample.
He went to the office and returned saying it was very good. No
samples were taken on Tuesday or Wednesday nights. On Thurs-
day, the boss, Mr. Felger, forced the sample man and a millwright,
Angelo Sylvester, to sign a sample check without letting them see
the contents. Felger then fired Brandy for producing a bad sample.
Brandy asked him when the sample was taken, and was told Tues-
day night. Brandy replied, "Then I guess that sample ain't mine,"
He said, "why?" Brandy replied, "Because Tuesday nobody take
any sample four to twelve." Felgar responded, "I have to make
that change on either Monday or Tuesday, and you go up and get
your clothes and get the Hell out of here."' 3 J & L discharged
Brandy November 28, 1936, Thanksgiving Day - a working day at J
&L.
Croatian laborer Eli Bozich was warned by his foreman for not
voting for the company union. The foreman complained that the
Croats, Serbs and Slavs never voted in the company union
elections.
Royal Boyer, a leader in the African-American community,
151. Letter from attorney for Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation to H.A. Wiley, Chair,
National Steel Labor Relations Board 2 (Sept. 6, 1935), in Steel - NSLRB Correspondence,
1934-35, Beaver Valley Labor History Society Papers (on file in Labor Archives, Univ. of
Pitt.).
152. Petitioner's Brief, in NLRB Record, supra note 6, at 16.
153. NLRB Record, supra note 6, at 259-60 (testimony of Dominic Brandy).
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joined J & L in 1924, working up from the labor gang to making
nails. He was fired when a ten pound sample of bad nails turned
up in his buggy. Normally a buggy holds 1200 to 1500 pounds. Two
men dumped their nails in the same bin, the crooked nails, a single
tray's worth, were all found in the same place in the buggy and an
immediate inspection of the machinery by the inspector, operator
and foreman showed nothing wrong. Bent nails were readily availa-
ble from a scrap heap. Before his discharge Boyer had been given a
Republican sample ballot by Superintendent John Akin and told,
"Here is a ballot and I mean for you to put the mark where the
mark is, and if you don't you will see the consequences, what it will
be." Nail inspector, Chester Hodney, told Boyer's wife, "If I was
Royal I would not have anything to do with the union
whatever."154
The Company instructed George Maroll, machinist helper, to
operate a machinist's drill press during the night shift, despite the
fact he had no training and no apprenticeship. He was then fired
for being "hopeless" in ability, despite the fact the company kept
him doing jobs on the press for months, at the helper's pay, not as
a machinist. Maroll was married and had three children, so he did
not complain at the time.
The final discharged witness, Angelo Volpe, married with four
children, was president of the Democratic Social Club, vice presi-
dent of Lodge #200, and worked for J & L since 1914, a laborer,
greaser, rougher, weigh-master, and night foreman in the cold roll
department. In 1930, he was busted to a laborer again for refusing
to work on Easter Sunday. At that time, he was a crane operator in
the tube mill. Management had assigned untrained men to the
hookers jobs to save wage rates. An inexperienced man hooked up
one of Volpe's loads badly. It was re-hooked and the man gave a
head signal to go. A State inspector bawled Volpe out for following
a head signal rather than a hand signal. Although head signals
were often used, Volpe was discharged. J & L police officers contin-
ued to follow Volpe even to the day he testified before the NLRB.
All the men fired in the case were charter members of Beaver
Valley Lodge #200; the first president, vice president, financial
secretary, the president's half-brother (the first of the group fired),
and a trustee. They were leaders of the Italian, Croatian, Black,
Slavic and Anglo communities. One was the first president of the
Democratic Social Club. The NLRB handed down its decision or-
dering the reinstatement of these men with back pay, April 9,
1936. It would take a year until the Supreme Court upheld the
154. Id. at 294. (testimony of Royal Boyer).
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board's decision.
On July 10, 1936, another fourteen men, fourteen of the eigh-
teen attending the first SWOC meeting, were fired immediately af-
ter SWOC entered Aliquippa in June, 1936. They invoked their
legal rights in a Manifesto to the company important to organizing
activity. These men certainly felt the power of the company as the
control of a community they were inextricably part of as they de-
manded a family wage:
We, the undersigned, have been discharged within the past ten days
from your employment for union activity. In addition, some two dozen other
union men have been discharged within the past 18 months, 10 of whom
have referred their cases to the National Labor Relations Board, which or-
dered their reinstatement.
We, as employees of the Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, have con-
tinuous service records ranging from three to 26 years. We 14 recently dis-
charged men have a combined service record with your corporation of 181
years, an average of 13 years each. One of us with 23 years service lost an
eye in your employment. Another with eleven years of service lost the fin-
gers of his right hand....
Our daily wages, on the dates of our respective discharges, varied from
$3.76 per day to $6.12 per day, or an average of $4.92 per day. This is a
weekly average of $24.60. With families averaging five in number, (using the
shamefully inadequate standards of public relief) with $3.50 deducted for
clothes, $5.00 for rent, .35 cents for light, $2.00 for household necessities,
$1.00 for doctor, and $1.00 for transportation to work, $11.75 remains for
food for the entire family for one week. This amounts to $1.68 for food for
the entire family for one day, or 56 cents for the entire family for each meal.
This leaves eleven cents per meal for each member of the family.
We and each member of our families live on eleven cent meals. Each of
us is clothed for seventy cents a week. Each of us is doctored for twenty
cents a week. On such an income we are unable to stay out of debt, let alone
prepare for old age. You hire us as young, strong, healthy men. You work us
for twney [sic] years, the best years of our lifes [sic], then you replace us
with younger men from whom you also take the best years of their lives,
only to throw them on the ash heap. From amongst these facts one thing
stands out: Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation lacks any social responsibil-
ity whatsoever for its employees and for the community in which they live.
co. union/ [sic] We have patiently waited for three years for your [sic]
to do something about increasing our wages, so we could get away from ten
cent meals. We have received nothing thru [sic] the company union, except
water fountains and showers. And our children are unable to eat water
fountains, and our wifes [sic] and duaghters [sic] are unable to wear show-
ers. Therefore, after the inability of the, company union to do anything for
us was unquestionably established we joined the Amalgamated Association
of I.S. & T.W. of N.A., lodge #200, under the direction of the Steel Workers
Organizing Committee, for the purpose of bettering our living standards and
working conditions, which we were unable to do anything about through the
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company union.
By discharging us you have announced to your employees, and to the
general public, that you propose to interfere with their legal and constitu-
tional rights to join an organization of their own choosing. Furthermore you
have thusly announced to your employees, and the general public, that you
intend, and are so doing, to violate the Federal Constitution and acts of
Congress so that you can interfere with the legal and constitutional rights of
your employees.
We are writing this letter to you to announce that, in return, we who
have been discharged for union activity are organized not only onto the
Amalgamated Association of I.S. & T.W. of N. A., not only under the juris-
diction of the Steel Workers Organizing Committee, but we are also organ-
ized into the Honor Roll Committee. Only those men discharged for union
activity are eligible to become members of the Honor Roll Committee. It is
our purpose to further the self-organization of our fellow-workers into the
union of their own choosing, so that working conditions and living standards
can be bettered, and so that our employer can be made to live up to the
laws of the land, and not disregard and violate them like highly publicized
gangsters do.
We shall appreciate any additional members you choose to add to our
Honor Roll Committee. The larger our committee the better the chances, we
believe, of making J & L not only stand for Jones & Laughlin, but also
stand for Justice & Liberty.115
The Honor Roll Committee reached 54 members. Pete Cekoric,
one of the original fourteen, a year later exclaimed, "When I hear
the Wagner bill went constitutional I happy like anything. I say,
good, now Aliquippa become part of the United States."156
Atallah had seized upon John L. Lewis's offer of one-half mil-
lion dollars to organize the steel industry in the face of the reticent
Amalgamated, claiming no small role in the schism and the crea-
tion of SWOC. Invited by Lewis to the April 14, 1936 meeting of
the Committee for Industrial Organization, which Lewis as yet had
failed to swing to a direct move on the AA, Atallah was asked by
Sidney Hillman, "What can we do when the resolution which [was]
introduced by Mr. Lewis to have the money appropriated by the
A.F. of L. is voted against by the Amalgamated?" Atallah replied,
"haven't you gentlemen forgotten that within exactly fourteen
days from today, the convention of the Amalgamated convenes in
Canonsburg, Pennsylvania: Why not make the offer directly to the
Amalgamated? And if the Amalgamated fails to accept the offer,
then the convention will want to know why." Mr. Dubinsky said,
"Are you telling us now that you will be able to deliver the conven-
155. J & L Firings, in Steel Workers Union file (located in Labor Archives, Pattee Li-
brary, Penn. State University, University Park, Pa.).
156. Pete Cekoric, BEAVER VALLEY LAB. HiST. J., June 1979, at 8.
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tion?" "I'm not telling you a darn thing. All I can tell you is that I,
together with my associate will bring it out and fight it. And if we
go down, we will go down fighting - at least the public and the
world will know why." Hillman said, "What else can you expect
out of a man." Fifteen minutes later Lewis came to the door to
shake hands, "Congratulations, you put it over."'1 7 At the Canon-
sburg convention, eleven locals, including Lodge #200, were re-
fused seats. When Michael Tighe asked Atallah if he had anything
to say, he took the floor from 1:00 p.m. to 5:30 p.m., documenting
the whole history of the relationship of the lodge to the interna-
tional. The convention voted to seat the locals. 158 Five weeks later
the Amalgamated agreed to jointly establish SWOC with the CIO.
On June 17, 1936, following the CIO schism with the AFL,
John L. Lewis set up the Steel Workers Organizing Committee in
Pittsburgh. SWOC took over the cowed and increasingly inactive
AA local #200. From approximately 6000 members, the lodge
could count on only 72.159 Veteran UMW organizer Joseph Timko
moved to Aliquippa and established a union office at 141 Hopewell
Avenue. Timko started in the mines at age fourteen, organized the
first boilermakers local, organized Indiana mines as president of
UMW District 11, and then was assigned to Harlan County, Ken-
tucky by the International. The organization campaign stepped up
as union staff increased. One of the organizers sent to help was
Harold Ruttenberg, then head of the SWOC research department.
In Beaver Valley, one year later, a central labor council was in
place and 51 locals held contracts covering 45,000 employees.
SWOC's regional organization strategy was top down and ex-
tremely tightly controlled by Lewis' people, who had undermined
the rank and file attempts for a national strike. 60 Whatever hope
might have fueled the rank and file strategy when the AA had re-
cruited between 150,000 and 200,000 in 1934-35, that possibility
disappeared when, by late 1935 and early 1936, those new members
had virtually entirely dropped out. Aliquippa proved no exception.
The SWOC based its strategy on co-opting Employee Repre-
sentation Plan representatives who had become disenchanted with
the corruption of the company unions, and on working through the
157. Atallah Interview, supra note 130, at 13.
158. Id. at 14.
159. NLRA Hearings, supra note 1, at 4180.
160. "SWOC will insist on a centralized and responsible control of the organizing cam-
paign . . . and will insist that local policies conform to the national plan of upon action
which it decides,. . . Responsibility begins and ends with this Committee." David Brody,
The Origins of Modern Steel Unionism: The SWOC Era, in FORGING A UNION OF STEEL,
supra note 91, at 27 (quoting Philip Murray).
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fraternal organizations of the foreign born. On the former, SWOC
President Philip Murray announced, "Unlike the traditional A.F.
of L. policy of calling company union representatives names, we
have catered to them with a view to swinging them over." 11 In
regard to the latter, SWOC believed it would be very difficult to
focus on African-Americans, because the companies had created
fear among them of job losses from unionization and actively sup-
ported racial division and tension among the workers. This atti-
tude went back to the 1919 strike when African-Americans were
brought into mills as strike breakers. An early SWOC position pa-
per closed, "It is our conviction, however, that the organization of
the negro steel workers will follow, rather than precede, the organi-
zation of the white mill workers."1 '
Yet SWOC did send Ben Careathers almost immediately into
Aliquippa. The Aliquippa Gazette, July 12, 1936, boxed an an-
nouncement, "Information You Should Have" from the Loyalists.
"Ben Carreathers, [sic] Negro Communist organizer,. . . is one of
the principal leaders, and is connected with the leading Commu-
nistic and radical organizations in the Pittsburgh district and adja-
cent territory. His principle aim is to unite the negroes and whites
against the capitalist class."' 63 This much was undoubtedly true.
However, it did not prevent his effectiveness. He was recognized
almost immediately in Aliquippa from his defense of the Scott-
sboro Boys, and the Communist commitment to unified unions and
race equality helped secure union cards among black workers the
SWOC thought unsupportive. Careathers was able to organize the
National Conference of Negro Organizations, representing 110
groups with a membership of 100,000 in Pittsburgh to pledge sup-
port for organizing steel into one industrial union. This became im-
portant as, according to one estimate, 80% of Western Pennsylva-
nia's 5235 Black steel workers worked for either Carnegie (U.S.
Steel) or J & L.164
Ironically, the alliance between the CIO and the National Ne-
gro Congress was one avenue through which the national SWOC
leadership consciously introduced communist labor organizers into
steel and Aliquippa. Philip Murray attributed much of the Ali-
161. Philip Murray, Report to the Steel Workers Organizing Committee 6 (Sept. 29,
1936) (located in SWOC file, Labor Archives, The Catholic University of America, Wash.
D.C.).
162. Untitled document, 1936 (located in Dept. of Archives and Manuscripts, The
Catholic University of America, Wash., D.C.).
163. Information You Should Have, ALIQUIPPA GAZETTE, July 12, 1936, at 1.
164. DiCKERSON, supra note 79, at 146.
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quippa success to Careathers. 16 5 The SWOC brought in rank and
file activists, including Communists, after the party dropped its
dual union strategy and disbanded the Steel and Metal Workers
International Union. 166 SWOC used their organizing ability and
discharged them when continued employment became a source of
outside pressure.
The use of ERP men brought Paul Normile and Clifford
Shorts into prominence in organizing in Aliquippa. Normile would
later become the first president of Local 1211 of the United Steel
Workers Association. In 1936, Normile served as a truck driver and
ERP representative (from its inception in June, 1934) in the ser-
vice department. His assistant, Joe Latone, was active in the AA.
In September, Normile and nine other ERP representatives, with-
out company approval, set up a Joint Wage and Means Committee
to pressure J & L for higher wages and better working conditions.
The Company refused to bargain. Disillusioned, Normile began se-
cret meetings with SWOC supporters. On January 3, 1937, he,
Shorts, and three other Joint Committee members signed SWOC
cards, with an open letter:
We believe the company union plan of collective bargaining to be
equivalent to the age-old custom of writing letters to the mythical Santa
Claus.
We are convinced that a majority of the employee representatives are
honest and sincere but that they become hopeless prey when confronted
with the elaborate series of processes through which each case must pass
and the unflinching attitude of the management which acts as both final
judge and jury.167
When SWOC Local 1211 was officially set up to replace AA Lodge
#200, February 13, 1937, sub-regional SWOC director Timko rec-
ommended Normile be made president. He was, and Clifford
Shorts, another ERP representative, became financial secretary.
Both men quit their jobs to work full time for the union. In the
local elections of 1937, Normile was one of two of the first Demo-
cratic councilmen elected in Aliquippa.
During the Steel Labor Board hearings, the investigator ap-
pointed by the board was Clinton Golden. Golden could not con-
vince workers to talk freely with an outsider, so he donned a
beaten, old trenchcoat, removed his false teeth, smeared his face
165. PHm S. FONER, ORGANIZED LABOR AND THE BLACK WORKER, 1619-1973, at 219
(1974).
166. Lynd, supra note 112, at 203. Lynd believed 60 of the approximately 200 or-
ganizers were contributed by the Party.
167. Paul Normile, BEAVER VALLEY LAB. HIsT. J., Dec. 1980, at 1.
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and hands and snuck into the Aliquippa beer gardens to eaves-
drop.16 When the CIO formed SWOC, it hired Golden as its re-
gional director for Western Pennsylvania. Golden turned the tables
on J & L by infiltrating the main office with his own spy, a man
named Malone, who signed his dispatches "M". Initially hired for
the labor gang, and having boasted to the employment manager of
working for a number of strike breaking detective agencies, M
turned in sufficient information on small in plant burglaries to gain
the favor of a Captain Nicholson in the J & L police. Nicholson
gave M a note for the superintendent of the strip mill, J.B.
Carlock:
My dear Mr. Carlock: The bearer, Barry Malone, check #27339, is a very
good friend of both Captain Mauck and myself. He is now a laborer and
would very much like to improve his position and get something that pays a
little better. Anything you can do for him will be greatly appreciated by
both myself and Captain Mauck.
Carlock gave M a timekeepers job which offered him the freedom
to move around the plant. While M sat in Nicholson's office an
open cabinet revealed at least 150 .38 caliber revolvers and three
100 shot drums for Thompson .45 caliber sub-machine guns,
among many wrapped packages.6 ' M was next assigned to be a
weighmaster. His undisclosed college background led him to teach-
ing classes on computations and writing a weighmasters handbook.
From there, M was promoted to Supervisor of Weighmasters,
worked out of the office of J.W. Murphy, one of the board of strike
policy of J & L, and finally moved into the plant's general man-
ager's office where he reported on the will of the corporate manage-
ment to continue resisting the union. Highest level management
never expected to lose the drive. However, they were planting un-
dercover agents in every section of the corporation, encouraging
some to join the union in order to maintain surveillance.
The steel industry responded to organizing pressures with
sticks and carrots. On the establishment of a SWOC presence in
Aliquippa, a J & L spokesman predicted,
Our men do not seek unionization of the type Mr. Lewis and his follow-
ers advocate. We are not afraid of the campaign begun by Mr. Lewis. We
are not ashamed of our labor record. We have tried, and I think success-
fully, to be fair in our relationships with our employees. The employee rep-
resentation plan has worked out well and we think it will function properly
168. THOMAS R. BROOKS, CLINT: A BIOGRAPHY OF A LABOR INTELLECTUAL - CLINTON S.
GOLDEN 129 (1978).
169. Unidentified document, in Clinton Golden Papers (on file in Box 7, File 15 of La-
bor Archives, Pattee Library, Penn. State Univ., University Park, Pa.).
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despite what Mr. Lewis and his followers say. 17 0
At the same time the company distributed this circular to the
workers:
The stand of the Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation in the matter of
the union is clear.
The company is against the closed shop and will not tolerate on its
payroll those who agitate labor trouble in the mill, nor will the mill operate
with workmen organized by trouble-makers and Communists.
The $30,000,000 plant now being erected in Pittsburgh was lost to Ali-
quippa through labor agitation and the value of every dwelling dropped 30
cents on the dollar.
Your employee representative plan is not run by outsiders who demand
tribute from you for the right to work.
Open shop means pay days; closed shop means no pay days.
Representatives of the radical and communistic groups are helping in
the strike agitation in Aliquippa.
Compare the steel districts with the closed-shop mining districts made
by Lewis.
Business districts never recover from strikes.
Have some one estimate what the value of your property or business
would be if Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation closed their plants.
And the plant will close if the union and communistic agitation contin-
ues in our community.
Force and intimidation are the tools of the professional agitator and
organizer. Violence and bloodshed the tools of the Communists.
The law gives you the right to work without paying tribute.
William Z. Foster has announced his support of the Lewis racket. What
does his name mean to the true American?
The Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation has been fair and honest with
its employees. Do not permit our community to be overrun by organizers,
agitators and Communists.
Where is the Mount Sinai from which Mr. Lewis is receiving the tablets
naming him as the one to lead the people from their peaceful paths to ha-
tred of their neighbor and their employer?
Yours respectfully,
Your Fellow-workman. 171
The Aliquippa Gazette editorialized:
It is not in any sense of the word a question of these labor leaders try-
ing to do something for the good of the wage earners; what they are trying
to do is build up an organization of dues-paying members by which they
hope to keep their staff of paid agitators and organizers at work. In this way
they hope to form one Big Union, after which they hope to control the
170. Labor Board Clash Spurs Steel Union, N.Y. TxMEs, July 11, 1936, at 6.
171. Id.
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country both industrially and politically. There can be no doubt if their
move is at all successful a Labor Party will be organized, through which
they expect to dominate the political future of the United States.
We hear from time to time that John L. Lewis, Philip Murray, and
other leaders are high type, highly intelligent gentlemen. We challenge this
and claim that these men, and others like them are racketeers of the first
order who prey upon the more common-type of workman and levy tribute
and assessment of some kind and another, even though the employees can-
not afford to pay one penny toward any organization that cannot possibly
help them to support their families.172
Timko responded by issuing leaflets:
I want to thank the Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation for aiding
our campaign by using such tactics. We have nothing to hide. We have
nothing to fear. We conduct our activities openly and aboveboard. We are
pursuing this campaign along powerful legal lines. We deplore the fact that
others do not do likewise.
73
On the other hand, in November, 1936, the companies unilat-
erally raised wages $0.10 per hour, and after SWOC negotiations
with U.S. Steel, the industry added another $0.10 per hour in
March, 1937. The combined increases raised wages by 33%. But
the strategy backfired as workers believed the union to have been
principally responsible anyway. Timko argued that the redistribu-
tion of profits to wages served the public interest by stimulating
business through the greater purchasing power of workers. Then
the impact of the totally unexpected U.S. Steel contract triggered
increasing membership in Aliquippa. On the afternoon of March 1,
a SWOC organizer in Aliquippa phoned Murray at the Grant
Building in Pittsburgh to report that he had heard wild rumors.
"One of the steel workers just came in and said he heard over the
radio that U.S. Steel was meeting with the C.I.O. I told him he was
crazy and kicked him out of the office." "Well don't kick him out,"
Murray chided, "It's true. '174
On April 12, 1937, the Supreme Court upheld the constitution-
ality of the Wagner Act. J & L management did not begin to take
the law seriously until then. On May 7, 1937, 600 employees met to
establish the United Iron and Steel Workers of Aliquippa, an os-
tensibly independent union, to replace the illegal company union,
the ERP. The group elected William H. Turner of the accounting
department as chairman.'1 5 It was too late. One month later on
172. Editorial, ALIQUiPA GAzxTr, July 2, 1936.
173. BROOKS, supra note 91, at 118.
174. IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE TURBULENT YEARS 473 (1970).
175. Local Union is Formed by J & L Employees, ALIQUIPPA GAZE=TE, May 11, 1937, at
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May 12, 1937, J & L workers voted to walk out if an exclusive bar-
gaining contract was not signed with the Steel Workers Organizing
Committee. J & L Chairman H.E. Lewis offered to sign a collective
bargaining contract with SWOC if it could also sign a similar con-
tract with any other group of non-SWOC members. Philip Murray
refused, knowing that men who feared the past would choose to sit
out on those terms. Murray also refused an exclusive representa-
tion election until union strength could be tested.17 6 On May 13,
the strike began and on May 15, J & L capitulated. On May 21, the
Aliquippa and Pittsburgh Works of J & L voted to establish the
United Steel Workers, CIO as their exclusive bargaining
representative.
This period from 1933-1937 was hardly peaceful. If it is not
clear that anyone died in the organizing, many were severely
beaten, families and neighborhoods divided, and, in particular,
union supporters and their families suffered enormously. In that
sense, company recalcitrance, and company duplicity through the
captured company Employee Representation Plan created resent-
ment. Tough and effective outside organizers with UMW money
sufficient for the first time, tightened organization and demon-
strated staying power. Desperate economic circumstances in the
shadow of obscene profits being reaped by J & L led many to seek
some new representation and power. In 1936, J & L netted
$4,129,600.00 or $7.03 per share.177 But no one present foresaw the
overwhelming solidarity and support of the community for organi-
zation now, and desperately now, in 1937. In a sense, a group of
steelworkers didn't strike as much as an entire town struck.
Dominic Del Turco, picket captain, worked the 1800 man
Welded Tube Department. At fifteen minutes to eleven o'clock, he
walked the length of the plant, thumb down, the signal to get
ready. At two minutes to eleven he instructed leaders to blow
whistles in the noisy Butt Mills. At the end of the plant he and his
strong arm men met a 300 lb. worker and Assistant Superinten-
dent Volcher. The worker said, "Who's going to carry me out? I'll
tear you apart you little shrimp." Del Turco whistled and five men
ran over to carry him out.1 78
A young organizer, undoubtedly overly enthusiastic, described
1.
176. "[Tjhe union was by no means sure of its ability to win an election, and it may
have wanted the strike as a demonstration of its power, to help convince workers who were
on the fence." WALTER GALENSON, THE CIO CHALLENGE TO THE AFL 98 (1960). See also
BRooKs, supra note 91, at 123.
177. Tm A BRmGE DAILY CrrZN, Mar. 25, 1937, at 1.
178. Del Turco Interview, supra note 110, at 19.
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the strike,
No one, not even ourselves, believed it possible. It was fantastic to
think of. We expected to get the men out, certainly, but not all of them, and
not without some opposition from "loyal" groups or from city or company
police. But, no, not a bit of it. The walk out was complete, and as far as I
can determine 100% effective. For the first time in years, the valley is not
brilliant red at night with smoke and fire from the Bessemer furnaces.
It was something of a revolution, too. Aliquippa rose up against a tyr-
anny that had held them in bondage for years. For all practical purposes,
the workers took over the functions of government. They were in complete
control. Only for less than two hours were city police even in sight. The
picket line was absolutely effective. No one got thru [sic], not even the po-
lice who tried to force thru [sic] an allegedly empty bus. The cops came
with tear gas and guns. They threatened our men if we impeded their pro-
gress, but the bus could not get thru [sic]. It was pushed back and out. Only
once did the police win in a fracas. They were permitted to go [in] on foot,
but when they tried to get out again, they were stopped. They had tear gas
and used it to blast their way out.
The strike is a rank and file affair. SWOC may have called it, but it is
in the hands of anybody who can lead. It is a mob, not an organization. We
organizers have no more control than our lungs can bring us.
There were perhaps one or two thousand at the meeting when the
strike call was issued. These men were scattered among the various gates at
9:30. Shifts change at 11. The strike was to begin with the preventing of the
night shift from going on duty. First thing we did was to take possession of
the tunnel and roads leading thereto. You remember these roads are shaped
like a Y and lead directly into the center of town. Our men got American
flags and poles and stretched them across the entrance. Behind these per-
haps 500 to 1000 people were stationed. Across the street, at the railroad
station, at windows, in the parking lot, thousands more assembled. All of
these were interested in the strike - J & L is Aliquippa - but few intended
to be pickets. Nevertheless, they served that purpose. By the time the sec-
ond turn came off duty, our active men had increased to thousand, and in
addition to this a good share of those who left the plant remained outside
for picket duty. Get the picture. All Aliquippa was there - that is, all except
the police. They came later in steel helmets and with guns and tear gas to
direct traffic for a short time, but except for what I nentioned above, they
played no part in the strike. Fully half the town remained on the scene till
after one o'clock, by which time practically all the men were out of the
mill. 79
Women, almost all wives of steel workers, were among the most
militant at the gates.180 Mary Cozzicolli remembered,
179. Letter from Meyer Bernstein (May 13, 1937), in Beaver Valley Labor History Soci-
ety Papers (on file in Labor Archives, University of Pittsburgh). See also BROOKS, supra
note 91, at 123-26.
180. Strike Closes Aliquippa Plant, AIBRIDGE DAmY CITIZEN, May 13, 1937, at 1, 4.
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I was at the Wye most of the time and we had quite a few women and
elderly women that would stay there night and day and I'm not joking,
without no sleep night and day, and I mean they had umbrellas and they
were really going to pick up their part because you know, this was their
bread and butter to them ... 1811
The women alerted pickets to a mail truck they thought to be
stuffed with food for the staff still inside, which was halted and
overturned with their help.182 The only police action took place the
second day of the strike. Police fired five or six tear gas cannisters
at a group of 250 pickets who surrounded Borough Police Chief
Ambrose and Burgess William Sohn as they emerged from a tour
of the plant. Mrs. Mary Sample, a striker's wife, was arrested for
allegedly striking Chief Ambrose with an umbrella.' Violence oc-
curred rarely when men tried to force past picket lines, but a
handful were severely beaten and a windshield was smashed. One
of the tense moments happened when Governor Earle drove
through the Wye tunnel to be met by the aimed rifles of Company
police who recognized their mistake too late. In general, the heav-
ily outnumbered police, both Borough and Company simply tried
to unclog traffic. The bus company had to suspend operations, and
with pickets at the train terminal, no trains (all company owned)
stopped. Pickets also blocked the end of the Ambridge Bridge. J &
L was closed and so was Aliquippa.
The strike lasted 36 hours, ending when J & L Chairman H.E.
Lewis agreed to sign an exclusive bargaining contract if the SWOC
could win an NLRB election.
Suddenly a white paper like a flag of truce fluttered above the crowd..
"A victory has been won! Jones & Laughlin has signed an agreement with
the Steel Workers Organizing Committee. The strike is officially declared
over," Joe Timko's voice blared out to the tense waiting crowd. . . "I can't
believe it's over," one girl said. "They were tear gassin us last night. Yes,
last night Turner's vigilantes was bragging they was goin' to shoot us
out."1
8 4
Timko urged the people to go home.
No one left. Anybody who walked out of the mill was spat upon by the
181. Interview with Mary Cozzicolli 7 (n.d.) [hereinafter Cozzicolli Interview], in Bea-
ver Valley Labor-History Society Papers (on file in Labor Archives, Univ. of Pitt.). See also
Interview with Andy Lopata 48 (July 2, 1979) [hereinafter Lopata Interview], in Beaver
Valley History Society Papers (on file in Labor Archives, Univ. of Pitt.).
182. Cozzocolli Interview, supra note 181, at 8.
183. BEAVER VALLEY TiMEs, May 14, 1937.
184. MARY H. VORSE, LABOR's NEW MILLIONS: THE GROWTH OF A PEOPLE'S POWER 116-
17 (1938).
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women and attacked by the men. Somehow Timko managed to hire a band
and, carrying an American flag, he led a parade of 20,000 people away from
the Aliquippa Works. The procession spun out for twelve miles along the
Ohio River.8 5
Governor George Earle praised Philip Murray and John L. Lewis
for the prompt settlement and conducting the extensive strike with
virtually no violence: "Any company which does not want to nego-
tiate as J & L did ought to be ashamed of itself."186 Formally, the
agreement included six points:
1. The men were to return at once pending a Wagner Act election.
2. J & L promised not to interfere or coerce workers in rights of self
organization, as guaranteed by the Wagner Act.
3. J & L would facilitate elections at its plants.
4. Pending final determination, conditions then in effect in contract be-
tween SWOC and Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp. would be observed by J & L.
5. "The corporation agrees to negotiate and sign an exclusive bargain-
ing contract with the SWOC in the event a majority of those participating
in the election select the SWOC as a collective bargaining agency."
6. All employees as of May 12, 1937, will be returned to their former
positions without discrimination. 187
The next week, the workers voted without incident 17,028 to
7,207 for the union, with the vote 7,940 to 3,191 in Aliquippa.",8
The ballot contained a single question: "Do you want the Amalga-
mated Association of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers of North
America through the Steel Workers' Organizing Committee of the
Committee for Industrial Organization to represent you as the ex-
clusive representative for collective bargaining?"' 8 Broken down
by departments, Blast Furnaces workers voted: 443-156; Steel
Works, Open Hearth and Bessemers: 479-136; Blooming Mills: 501-
264; By-Product Coke Works: 183-192; Fourteen Inch Mill: 112-
201; Tin Plate: 1960-642; Wire and Rod Mills: 936-458; Welded
Tube: 1100-411; Seamless Tube: 829-381; Electrical: 173-130;
Mechanical, Blacksmiths, Riggers and Cranes: 483-301; Carpenters,
Bricklayers, Laborers and Motor: 695-622; Misc. 46-136."90
The exclusive agency agreement became the first the steel-
workers won in the industry; won in the first great industrial elec-
185. BERNSTEIN, supra note 174, at 477. The band cost $175. BROOKS, supra note 91, at
127.
186. Jones & Laughlin Steel Strike is Ended, AMBRIDGE DAILY CrIZEN, May 14, 1937,
at 1.
187. Id.
188. 2 to 1 at J & L, PITTSBURGH PRESS, May 21, 1937, at 1.
189. Id. at 10.
190. Id.
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tion conducted in the country. In an important sense, Murray had
staked the future of the SWOC and the entire Little Steel cam-
paign on this victory. Yet one day before the vote, Philip Murray
charged Little Steel with a last ditch effort to sabotage the elec-
tion, the captains of the Republic Steel police forces in Cleveland,
Buffalo, Canton, and Warren, with their lieutenants and 30 mem-
bers of their Cleveland gas pipe gang, were reported in Aliquippa.
The underlings and some of the officers had all at one time worked
at J & L. Republic responded that the men were just there to ob-
serve. 19 1 William Turner, the president of the former ERP and now
independent United Iron and Steel Workers of Aliquippa, gave an
affidavit to the NLRB July 25, 1937. Jim Williams, Chief of Re-
public Steel's police force, met with him in Aliquippa the week of
the election. Williams ordered 10,000 handbills printed in English,
Serbian, Slavish, and Italian, ostensibly on behalf of the United
Iron and Steel Workers, urging a no vote and invoking the mob
rule, the beatings and the intimidation practiced by the SWOC
and their imported pickets. The cost was $453 for the foreign lan-
guage versions and $250 for the English. Despite the fact that Wil-
liams told the printer that Republic Steel would pay for the former
and UISW for the later, Turner denied having any part in the
handbilling. At the same time, the broke UISW was assured by
Mr. Mays of J & L that Republic Steel would pay the expenses of
speakers at anti-SWOC election rallies. Before the strike, Mr.
David Craig, characterized as the head of the J & L Republican
political machine, assured Turner he would get all the support he
would need when they crashed the picket lines. 92
When Justice Hughes ordered reinstatement of the ten work-
ers remaining in the suit they were given a heroes' parade down
mainstreet - Franklin Avenue. When asked what these men would
do after the lump sum payment of their back wages, one re-
sponded, "The court ordered us back to work"'193 not back to em-
ployment-back to work!-a difference not lost on the men. In the
early 1930s, when work had been cut to two days a fortnight in
many of the shops, the company had run shuttle boats to uninhab-
ited Cow Island in the middle of the Ohio so that workers and
their families could clear and farm small patches. Now women
stood in open windows along the way crying with joy and chanting
191. Republic Denies Murray's Charges on Steel Elections, AMBRIDGE DAILY CITIZEN,
May 19, 1937, at 1.
192. Affidavit of William H. Turner (July 23, 1937) [hereinafter Turner Affidavit], in
Jones & Laughlin Steel Co. Regulatory File (located in NLRB Archives, National Archives
Annex).
193. BEAVER VALLEY LAB. HIST. J., Jan. 1980, at 8 (caption of photograph).
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"no more Cow Island" as the parade marched by.
At least 42 men from the Honor Roll, fired for union activity
between January and July of 1936 (26 in one month from late
June) were rehired with seniority and back pay in response to the
union and the Supreme Court decision. Their back pay totalled
over $26,000. Of the original thirteen men discharged, nine re-
sumed their work at J & L. In the year outside, each had worked
some at other jobs, in addition to their back wages: Brandy was
paid $973 at the rate of $26 per week, earning $970.48; Volpe -
$862.21 at $22 per week, earning $1152.16; Phillips - $193.23 at
$27.50 per week, but earning $2,446.77; Dunn - $1313.12 at $5.16
per day, earning $1135.75; Maroll - $1329.83 at $24 per week, earn-
ing $463.14; Boyer - $1747.38 at $30 per week, earning $451.58;
Gerstner - $1171.94 at $27.50 per week, earning $836.; Razzano -
$1045.61 at $4.80 per day, earning $583.58; Bozich - $367.09 at $15
per week, earning $43.91; and Cox - $342.66 at $34 per week, earn-
ing $1332.54. Cox at that time owed the Woodlawn Land Co.
$593.11 and the Pittsburgh Mercantile Co. $49.76, almost twice as
much as his award. He refused J & L's offer of reinstatement con-
ditioned on the award offsetting his debt. In an important prece-
dent for the NLRB, Associate General Counsel Robert Watts or-
dered that under no circumstances would the Board agree to any
settlement requiring counterclaims and setoffs to back pay awards,
arguing that administrative proceedings were neither a suit at law
nor a private cause of action. At the time Phillips owed the Wood-
lawn Land Co. $244.83 and the Pittsburgh Mercantile Co. $24.81,
while Maroll, Boyer, and Razzano, owed the latter $113.06, $66.07,,
and $49.75, respectively. 194 Boyer guessed he would buy a house for
his wife and three children in Ambridge, Brandy put his money
together with a WWI bonus check to bring his wife and three chil-
dren from Italy, and Dunn, Maroll, Phillips, Gerstner, Cox Roz-
zano and Volpe planned to pay bills."9 5
The workers were organized and they had tasted their power,
economically and politically. Financial Secretary Clifford Shorts
recalled,
We knew that we were going to have some trouble in carrying out our
end of the agreement, perhaps, because for the first time in 30 years some of
the people in Aliquippa were feeling their own power, it was the first time
that they had ever been allowed or had ever been able to voice their own
opinions and do anything really for themselves.""'
194. Turner Affidavit, supra note 192.
195. J. & L. Plays 'Santa,' Pays Reinstated Men, PiTt. SUN TELEGRAPH, July 22, 1937.
196. NLRA Hearings, supra note 1, at 4188 (testimony of Clifford Shorts).
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Moreover, as the workers saw it, they had organized themselves
from the grass roots. The outside help was appreciated, but given
what they had resisted, organization only worked because the
workers had revolted. So, if they had struck to organize, they could
strike for justice and better treatment in the plant. The rest of
1937 saw a series of wildcat strikes, which Joe Timko had to put
down.197 Steward Andy Lopata wildcatted the first time in the
Seamless tube because hot steel would fall down upon the men.
When they blew the whistles, the men just stood by their ma-
chines. The strike lasted only fifteen minutes when Superintendent
Fisher promised an immediate coverplate. The second wildcat over
a work clothes laundry forced Timko to call Lopata to his office to
tell him that only the Local president could call a walkout. To the
men on the floor, it appeared that Timko only stopped them from
getting their rights.' The SWOC had won a contract but manage-
ment expectedodiscipline in return. Aliquippa steel workers chafed
at the apparent cowardice of the national leadership, but no seri-
ous work stoppage occurred. J & L attributed success to Timko:
He is a Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde. While we were fighting him, we
thought he was Mr. Hyde - one of the toughest organizers and hardest-fight-
ing strike leaders we had ever come up against. But now that we have been
dealing with him for two years, we've found him an able negotiator and
responsible union business official. 199
African-Americans as a group of workers also felt empowered,
starting more vigorous civil rights organizations, including leader-
ship from 1920s UNIA organizer Matthew Dempsey and union ac-
tivist Bartow Tipper. Black workers struck in 1944 protesting J &
L's failure to promote them to an equal share of open positions.00
Politically, the transformation of Aliquippa was more rapid
and complete. In the elections of 1937, the Democratic Party
197. Lopata Interview, supra note 181, at 15-24.
198. Id. at 21, 24.
199. BROOKS, supra note 191, at 110. For the SWOC vision of responsible unionism, see
CLINTON GOLDEN & HAROLD RUTTENBERG, THE DYNAMIcs OF INDUsTRIAL DEMOCRACY (1942).
David Brody sees a fit between the SWOC administration of the work force and a more
realistic and thus less militant workforce in steel. David Brody, The Origins of Modern
Steel Unionism: The SWOC Era, in FORGING A UNION OF STEEL 14-15 (Paul Clark et al.
eds., 1987). His view fits Aliquippa uncomfortably given the rank and file activity, the ac-
companying violent repression of workers, and the wildcats following unionization. While
the workers became disciplined, that was not their early inclination. Further, while acknowl-
edging rank and file mobilization as a factor in steel, he provides no explanation for the
ability of J & L workers to gain the exclusive representation contract that SWOC could not
get from Carnegie-Illinois. The best explanation is the civil uprising nature of the J & L
strike, unforeseen by management.
200. DICKERSON, supra note 79.
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elected union affiliated candidates to the office of Burgess (mayor)
and three of seven council seats. The sponsor of the Committee of
Five Hundred, a justice of the peace who held office for eight years
issuing fines to steel workers, the editor who called John L. Lewis
"Mad Dog", J.A. Ruffner, Republican Party Chairman and tax col-
lector since 1914, were swept out of office.2 0 1 Burgess Candidate
George Kiefer, a pro-union druggist campaigned,
We will have but one Chief of Police and one Police Force. Their duties
will be to police the town of Aliquippa, keep law and order and meddle with
nothing else... The Police Department will be under the direct supervision
of the Burgess with the approval of Council. The entire Police Force will
take orders from nobody else.20 2
Local President Paul Normile pledged as Councilman,
It has been the practice of past and present Councils to be dominated
and controlled by men who have no connection with borough affairs in their
selection and dismissal of members of the police force. The police force was
not selected for the ability of the various members, but consisted of im-
ported persons responsible to special interests not legally having a voice in
civic matters... We pledge ourselves that in the selection of police officers,
we will first select local residents.203
The first battle of the split Council occurred on a motion intro-
duced by the SWOC members to fire six of the most vicious police-
men. In subsequent elections, SWOC candidates essentially swept
all municipal elections. This secured the streets and public places
for a liberty the workers had never experienced before. As one steel
worker appraised the victory of the union, "it was 'worth twelve
dollars a year to be able to walk down the main street of Ali-
quippa, talk to anyone you want about anything you like, and feel
that you are a citizen.' ,2o4
201. LEVmSON, supra note 103, at 274.
202. Eric Leif Davin, The Littlest New Deal: SWOC Takes Power in Steeltown, a Pos-
sibility of Radicalism in the Late 1930s at 50 (n.d.) (quoting UNION PRESS, Sept. 8, 1937, at
2).
203. Id. at 51. Steel workers documented the origin of the force: Chief Ambrose, previ-
ously at the J & L subsidiary Vesta Coal Co.; Lt. Honn, same; Sgt. Bloom, formerly a Ku
Klux Klan leader in Jefferson County and a strike breaking policeman at the mines; Sgt.
Grosskoff, not a resident of Pa., from the Marine Corp.; Tom Elms, local Republican stool
pigeon from Beaver Falls; Cole, from Waynesburg; Steel, from Bobtown, a J & L cop; Cook,
never a resident, Marine Corp.; Greenley, same; Costlow, former bootlegger and stool pig-
eon; Bradbury, former state policeman, never lived there; Moraski, former highway patrol-
man, never lived there; Fuss, U.S. Army, never lived there; Rendos, friend of Sgt. Bloom,
from DuBois; Powers, from W. Va. Id. at 44.
204. RICHARD CORTNER, THE JoNEs & LAUGHLIN CASE 168 (1971).
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CONCLUSION
The specific claims of this article are many and severable. At
one level - call it post-traditional legal realism 20 5 - recovering
the social history of Aliquippa reminds us that legal decisions oc-
cur in social contexts of action much richer than their accounts in
the law books or indeed those of official legal actors. Recovering
social history recovers important lost voices which should be
known by those who engage in the ongoing dynamic process of law
creation.0 5 Minimalist democracy requires accountability for the
exercise of power. Social history helps identify the people who
should demand that account.
At a second level - call it the internal critique of original in-
tent arguments - social history challenges the particular conserva-
tive authoritarianism of the Framers' intent by showing the way
particular cases arise out of patterns of disputes over conditions
and practices. 0 7 To the extent that intent as a methodology disci-
plining legal decision claims to be neutral to opposing legal inter-
ests, it requires that the meaning of past legal events be fully
known by the present decision maker who then merely compares
past and present characterizations. "These are the facts and there-
fore this is what would have sprung" from the fevered white brow
of the (largely) male proprietor holding the legal office promulgat-
ing the rule. To the contrary, the power of law is known by persons
subjected to legal power in much broader patterns of conflict.
Showing there is struggle suggests a gap between the legal meaning
for ordinary people and the meaning attributed through such
originalist speculation. It begs a different justification. If law is to
be consciously constructed as a visible, participatory discourse,
then no interpretation can be actually "original" if that means re-
moved from contested social context. If there is conflict to be me-
diated now, there is no particular reason to believe that the times
of the origin of any rule were any less uncertain, or that power was
other than compromised and distilled conflict. If arguments about
legal justice turn on "neutral" criteria, they must at least be made
more truly neutral by incorporating the contested sides of the so-
cial context of the past dispute as part of the relevant construction
of legal meaning for deployment in the present contest. Represen-
205. The forerunner of work such as this is the quintessential realism of WLLARD
HURST, LAW AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE LEGAL HISTORY OF THE LUMBER INDUSTRY IN WIS-
CONSIN 1836-1915 (2d ed. 1984).
206. Robert Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984).
207. See generally James Boyle, A Process of Denial: Bork and Post-Modern Conser-
vatism, 3 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 263 (1991).
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tations portrayed as consented to democratically must have some
correlation to the reality of those whose experience is represented.
At the third level - call it toward a democratic theory of law
- the social histories of a series of contemporary labor law cases
may reveal the connections between the many divisions of labor in
specific communities and their patterns of struggle over the con-
struction of power. If such a relationship between the pattern of
legal ideas which prevail and social contest over the meaning of
daily life can be established, then it should be important to chal-
lenge prevailing theories of law for their complicity in reinforcing
such social practices beyond the overly narrow and legalistic apolo-
gies of strict intent, state action, and the public-private distinc-
tion. 8 If we want power to be democratically shared as the best
context for the pursuit of freedom, then legal meaning in any form,
and its shaping of institutional practice, must have a democratic
account of not only law's internal operation but its meaning as a
socially deployed experience of political authority.209 We may not
want law to be democratic. We may wish something quite differ-
ent-power by the more or less coerced consent of the governed.
But, if we want democratic social functioning, we must change the
notion of law itself.
True democracy can never be achieved merely through the re-
distribution of the fruits of production. As we produce wealth to be
consumed, we also produce ourselves. True democracy must be
part of the distribution of production itself. Much of that distribu-
tion is understood and often accomplished through the power con-
structed by law and by agents claiming the authority of law. The
social history of Aliquippa is part of the J & L opinion. It had to
be if it was to operate as law. But the town and its people were
hidden in the blinders of Justice Hughes and in the blinders of a
legal practice meant to perpetuate inequality in the name of eco-
nomic practices that operate only in the absence of social forms of
production which could embody an authentic democracy. And in
this case the workers won! They won more than the lawyers knew
or could have known given their limited understanding born of le-
gal ideology. The presence of social struggle as necessary for un-
derstanding what happened as law in fact, and in producing the
events necessary to legal actions, is documented normally as the
presence left unsaid.
A more just and democratic legal practice has at least these
208. Kenneth Casebeer, Running on Empty: Justice Brennan's Plea, the Empty State,
the City of Richmond, and the Profession, 43 U. MIAmI L. REv. 989 (1989).
209. Staughton Lynd, Government Without Rights: The Labor Law Vision of Archi-
bald Cox, 4 INDus. REL. L. J. 483, 494 (1981).
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rough criteria, and this understanding confronts much of what we
as lawyers do. It is not to do history but to do law that the mean-
ing of law as a report of democratic experience must again be
found in Jones & Laughlin v. NLRB. There was an "unfair labor
practice" committed in July, 1935 and before, in Aliquippa, Penn-
sylvania - unfair to the democratic construction of community, to
the labor of the citizens and workers of Aliquippa to reproduce the
conditions of their shared enterprise, unfair through the purely
formal understanding of law limiting the employee to specific enti-
tlements in regard to the tools and resources of work, unfair to the
right to the self determination that a guarantee of collective organ-
ization was most literally fashioned to protect.
When Justice Hughes wrote, "[e]xperience has abundantly
demonstrated that the recognition of the right of employees to
self-organization and to have representatives of their own choosing
for the purpose of collective bargaining is often an essential condi-
tion of industrial peace, 21 ° he was by definition responding
through law to social conflict. He could have explicitly connected
the law he announced to the struggle over power which a prior re-
gime of constitutional interpretation protecting local control of ec-
onomic development had anticipated and structured.21 He could
have understood the passion for throwing off the alienation of con-
trol fueling the workers to break the peace of the quid pro quo. He
could have understood the passion for power to make their own
lives of the people of Aliquippa. He could have seen the threat to
national prosperity in their iron will for democracy. He could have
seen that American promise, because it was there in the law, in the
power, in the case.
210. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 42 (1937).
211. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding that liberty of contract
protected by Due Process prevents bakers from limiting their hours bypolitical contract,
when under market conditions individual contracts including limits are unachievable); Ham-
mer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (holding that where the the local police powers must
include deciding which contractual relations and other voluntary associations are approved
as public policy, child labor produced goods are thus protected against national denial of
access to the common market). But cf. West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937)
(holding that the state is not required to subsidize employers offering below subsistence
wages made marketable because of the unemployed surplus labor force resulting from struc-
tural failure of domestic market to clear commodity and labor gluts); NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (holding that when industries vertically organize
themselves in response to state choices of what mix of natural and legislated competitive
advantages to offer participants in local markets, national regulation must be permitted to
allow democratic construction of the national common market, including making possible
workers' coalitions access to the construction of local political-economies into their
communities).
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LCUSF33-02837 -Arthur Rothstein, SWOC Headquarters Aliquippa -
1938 - this is one of the most frequently used photos from the de-
pression.
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